The impact of economic policy and structural change on gender employment inequality in Latin America, 1990-2010 by Seguino, Stephanie & Braunstein, Elissa
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
The impact of economic policy and
structural change on gender employment
inequality in Latin America, 1990-2010
Stephanie Seguino and Elissa Braunstein
University of Vermont, Colorado State
15. August 2012
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/43261/
MPRA Paper No. 43261, posted 14. December 2012 05:29 UTC
 
 
 
The impact of economic policy and structural 
change on gender employment inequality  
in Latin America, 1990-2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Elissa Braunstein 
Department of Economics 
1771 Campus Delivery 
Colorado State University 
Fort Collins, CO 80523 
Email elissa.braunstein@colostate.edu 
 
 
Stephanie Seguino 
Department of Economics 
Old Mill 340 
University of Vermont 
Burlington, VT 05401 USA 
Email stephanie.seguino@uvm.edu 
 
 
June 2012 
Revised August 2012 
 
 
 
  
 1 
Table of Contents 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
II. Growth, Household Income Inequality and Poverty 
Evaluating the role of government policy, macroeconomic structure and global economic conditions 
 
III. Statistical Overview of Gender Inequality in Economic Opportunities 
Employment 
Unemployment 
Informalization 
Wages 
Poverty and Extreme Poverty 
Gender and Household Inequality 
Summary of Gender Inequality Findings 
 
IV. The Responsiveness of Employment to Economic Growth 
 Summary of Elasticity Results 
 
V. Econometric Analysis 
A. Model 
B. Data 
C. Estimation Strategy 
D. Discussion of Results 
 
VI. Concluding Remarks 
 
 References 
 
 
List of Figures and Tables 
 
Figure 1.  Household income Gini index by region, various years 
Figure 2.  Poverty rate by region, 1990s and 2000s 
Figure 3.  Female-to-male average years of education in population aged 15 and older, 
1990 and 2010 
Figure 4.   Average female-to-male employment to population ratio (15+), by country 
and region, 1990s versus 2000s 
Figure 5.  Percentage point change in average female-to-male employment to 
population ratio (15+), from the 1990s to the 2000s 
Figure 6.   Average female-to-male unemployment rate by country and region, 1990s 
and 2000s  
Figure 7.   Percentage point change in female-to-male unemployment rate from the 
1990s to 2000s, by country and region 
Figure 8.   Average female-to-male urban informalization rate by country and region, 
1990s and 2000s 
 2 
Figure 9.   Percentage point change in female-to-male urban informalization rate from 
the 1990s to 2000s, by country and region 
Figure 10.   Average female-to-male urban wage ratio by country and region, 1990s and 
2000s  
Figure 11.   Percentage point change in female-to-male urban wage ratio from the 1990s 
to 2000s, by country and region 
Figure 12.  Gender wage ratio relative to the minimum-to-average wage ratio: Percentage 
point changes in average values from the 1990s to the 2000s 
Figure 13.  Average female-to-male poverty rates by country and region, 1990s and 
2000s 
Figure 14.  Percentage point change in female-to-male poverty rates from the 1990s to 
2000s, by country and region 
Figure 15.   Difference between female-to-male poverty rates: 2009-10 average versus 
2000s average  
Figure 16.  Average female-to-male extreme poverty rates by country and region, 1990s 
and 2000s 
Figure 17.  Percentage point change in female-to-male extreme poverty rates from the 
1990s to 2000s, by country and region 
Figure 18.   Difference between female-to-male extreme poverty rates: 2009-10 average 
versus 2000s average  
Figure 19.  Gender and Household Income Inequality 
Figure 20. Employment to population ratio by sex, 1991-2010 
Figure 21.  Average social public expenditure as a share of GDP by country and region, 
1990s and 2000s 
Figure 22.   Percentage point change in average social public expenditure as share of 
GDP, 1990s to 2000s, by country and region 
Figure 23.  Minimum wage as a share of average wage by country and region, averages 
for 1990s and 2000s 
Figure 24.  Real effective exchange rate index by country and region, 1990-2010 
(2005=100) 
Figure 25. Real interest rate by country and region, various time periods 
Figure 26. Public investment as a share of GDP by country, average for the early 1990s 
versus the late 2000s.  
Figure 27.  Manufacturing exports as a share of manufacturing imports, by country and 
region (percent) 
Figure 28.  Fuel & ores as a share of exports by country and region, 1991-2010 average 
Figure 29. Terms of trade indices by country and region, 1990-2010 (2000=100)  
Figure 30.  Change in average share of trade and current account in GDP, 1990s and 
2000s 
Figure 31.  Changes in the dependency ratio 
 
Table 1.   Average annual real per capita GDP growth, various years 
Table 2.  Gini index by country, various years 
Table 3.  Trends in female and male income shares: The ratio of Q1 to Q5 
Table 4. Countries categorized by industrial and trade structures 
Table 5. Growth elasticity of employment, various time periods 
 3 
Table 6. Growth elasticity of employment controlling for labor supply, various time 
periods 
Table 7. Growth elasticity of employment by country, 1991-2010 
Table 8. Growth elasticity of employment by country controlling for labor supply, 
1991-2010 
Table 9. Growth elasticity of formal employment, various time periods 
Table 10.  Determinants of female and male employment rates 
Table 11.  Determinants of female and male unemployment rates 
 
Data Appendix 
 
 
  
 4 
I.   Introduction 
 
The main purpose of this paper is to analyze the impact of economic policy and structural 
change on gender inequality in employment and economic opportunities for a set of 18 Latin 
American countries over the time period 1990-2010.1 We use three different methodologies 
to explore this question: 1) statistical description of changes in a range of gender inequality 
in economic opportunity variables in the 1990s versus the 2000s; 2) estimates of the growth 
elasticity of employment for women and for men; and 3) econometric analysis of the 
determinants of gendered employment and unemployment levels, as well as the determinants 
of gender inequality in these variables.  
 
We begin by considering recent trends in growth, and the contemporaneous declines in 
household income inequality and poverty experienced throughout Latin America since the 
early 2000s. We include a careful review of the new literature seeking to evaluate the relative 
roles of government policy, macroeconomic structure, and global economic conditions in 
creating these new circumstances. We spend a good bit of time considering these analyses 
partly because they provide an analytical framework for evaluating gender inequality. But we 
also underscore what these types of analyses miss. From a gender perspective in particular, 
using the household as the unit of analysis ignores issues of the intra-household distribution 
of resources and responsibilities. And focusing on household income – regardless of its 
source – implicitly presumes that all improvements (whether it be, for instance, from labor 
income or a social pension) have equivalent effects on individual well-being. By contrast, our 
focus on gender-specific labor market outcomes indicates whether and how changes in 
economic policy and structure affect more than household income, and whether these 
changes contribute to creating the conditions for sustainable and transformative 
improvements in well-being and gender inequality.  
 
II. Growth, household income inequality and poverty  
 
By recent standards, much of the last decade has been a good one for GDP growth in Latin 
America. As illustrated in Table 1, for the region as a whole, annual real per capita growth 
averaged 3.9 percent during the expansionary period 2003-08. Growth then turned negative 
in 2009 (-1.8 percent) as a consequence of the global economic crisis but rebounded to 4.2 
percent in 2010. During the business cycle prior to that, 1990-2002, per capita growth 
averaged only 2.2 percent during the expansionary years of 1990-97, before declining to an 
annual average of only 0.2 percent in 1998-02, when the fallout from the global financial 
crisis spurred what was later referred to as the “lost half-decade.” The strong aggregate 
growth performance of the last decade masks some stark country-level differences, however. 
For instance, comparing per capita growth rates during the expansionary periods of the 
1990s (1990-97) versus the 2000s (2003-08), Argentina’s average annual per capita growth 
increased from 4.2 to 7.5 percent, Panama’s from 3.5 to 6.5 percent, and Peru’s from 2.1 to 
5.8 percent. Conversely, three countries had poorer growth performances in 2003-08 than in 
1990-97: El Salvador, Guatemala and Chile. Overall, however, the GDP growth record is 
                                                
1 The country sample includes: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Paraguay, El Salvador, Uruguay, and 
Venezuela. 
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much better in the 2000s than the 1990s, with the majority of countries also quickly 
recovering from the global collapse of consumer demand in 2009. 
 
That most countries in the region experienced sustained increases in growth is certainly an 
important and positive development. But that substantial declines in inequality and poverty 
accompanied this higher growth is more significant and promising from a well-being 
perspective. Figure 1 illustrates the household income Gini index by region in 1990, 1997, 
2002 and 2008, and Table 2 lists the index by individual country for the same years.2 The 
years 1990 and 1997, the beginning and end of the 1990s expansionary period, give a sense 
of how growth affected income inequality in the 1990s – for the most part either holding 
steady or increasing. During the “lost half-decade” 1998-02, inequality increased in most 
countries. Conversely, between 2002 and 2008, we see notable declines in the Gini index in 
all regions, going from 53.1 to 51.2 in the Central America and Mexico region, 54.5 to 50.9 
in the Andean Region, and from 53.8 to 49.8 in South America. Looking at the individual 
country indices in Table 2, we see declines in every country during this latter period with just 
two exceptions: Colombia and Nicaragua.3  
 
Class inequality calculated separately for women and men (that is, intra-gender inequality), 
can be measured as the average monthly female (male) income of the bottom to top quintiles. 
We observe some evidence of declining intra-gender inequality during this period, with the 
greatest improvements observed in Ecuador and Venezuela (Table 3). These results are 
somewhat surprising in that conditional cash transfer programs would have been expected to 
reduce within-gender income gaps, but there is little evidence of this for Argentina or 
Mexico, where the relative share of the bottom income quintile for women and men 
worsened. For many of those countries that experienced greater intra-gender equality from 
the early to late 2000s, the percentage point increase in the income of the bottom quintile 
relative to the top was greater for men than women. That said, fully a third of the countries 
for which we have data experienced a worsening of the intra-gender income distribution.  
 
As suggested by considering intra-gender inequality, optimism about household income 
inequality trends should be guarded. Gini coefficients based on household surveys may not 
fully describe the degree of inequality within countries. One reason is that household income 
surveys collapse male and female income and thus obscure trends in the degree of gender 
inequality. Secondly, there are measurement problems in household surveys, which often 
omit sources of income for the very wealthy. An alternative measure, the functional 
distribution of income, can overcome this problem. Data for Latin America show that the 
                                                
2 These Gini indices are from the Inequality and Development in Latin America (IDLA) dataset, and include 
both net (for wage earners) and gross (for the self-employed that pay taxes) income. Note that while broad 
patterns are the same, the IDLA indices are slightly lower than those recorded in the ECLAC-CEPALSTAT 
database; we used the former because of broader country and time series coverage. See Data Appendix for 
more information. 
3 Palma (2011) finds evidence Gini trends are primarily driven by changes in the share of income accruing to 
the top 10 percent. According to Palma’s evidence, the share of income going to the middle of the distribution 
is quite stable, but the bottom 10 percent of the distribution has been rendered less able to defend its share of 
the distribution as a result of the forces of globalization that have shifted bargaining power. Palma also notes 
that income inequality in Latin America, though reduced in recent years, is a uniquely unequal region relative to 
the rest of the world. 
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wage share of income, defined as the ratio of labor compensation to gross value added, has 
declined since the early 1980s, with no upward trend in the 2000s, in contrast to the Gini 
based on household surveys (Rodriguez and Jayadev 2010). The wage share of income does 
not, of course, capture redistribution via social expenditures and tax policies. But changes in 
labor shares do shed light on structural and political economy factors that contribute to 
changes in interpersonal inequality that should be taken into consideration in conjunction 
with the Gini and gender equality indicators.  
 
Turning to issues of poverty, Figure 2 gives a regional snapshot of changes in poverty rates 
over the period, with poverty defined as the level of household resources necessary to satisfy 
basic nutritional and non-nutritional needs.4 For Central America and Mexico, poverty rates 
have consistently declined since the early 1990s, though the percentage point decline in 
poverty from the early to late 2000s (from 52.2 to 42.2 percent) is almost twice the decline 
between the early 1990s and early 2000s (5.7 percentage points). Both the Andean Region 
and South America experienced increases in poverty rates between the early 1990s and 2000s 
(largely the result of the lost half-decade), with formidable declines in poverty rates between 
the early to late 2000s. During the 2000s, the poverty rate in the Andean Region declined 
from 54.2 to 40.8 percent, or 13.4 percentage points, and in South America from 37.9 to 
23.6 percent, or 14.3 percentage points. These figures, along with those documenting the 
decline in household income inequality, suggest that the recent economic boom experienced 
in Latin America has been more widely shared than in previous eras. Given declines in the 
wage share, one inference, however, is that improvement in the Gini is primarily attributable 
to social policies rather than income-equalizing structural changes. Whatever the source, 
whether we can extend the observation of greater household equality to changes in gender 
inequality is one of the questions we seek to answer in this paper. This is particularly 
important since as we noted, income inequality measures are at the household level, 
implicitly assuming pooling of income, and as a result can mask intra-household inequality 
along gender lines. 
 
Evaluat ing the ro le  o f  government pol i cy ,  macroeconomic s tructure and g lobal  economic 
condit ions 
 
The good economic news of the mid- to late-2000s coincided with progressive political 
changes in the region. A number of what we (and others) refer to as left-of-center (LOC) 
governments were democratically elected, ushering in a new era of reform in economic and 
social policy. At the same time, favorable global economic conditions lowered the “price” of 
reform, and scholarly debates on the relative importance of political regime versus a variety 
of macroeconomic policies and circumstances in lowering household income inequality and 
promoting shared growth ensued. Although none of this (macro) dialogue addresses the 
issue of gender inequality, it offers a useful basis for thinking about how to best structure 
our own inquiry.  
 
In terms of characterizing LOC macro policy, its core pillars emphasize macro stability, fiscal 
prudence, and free trade and capital flows, a stance that is essentially the same as the 
                                                
4 For more information see the technical note at: 
http://website.eclac.cl/sisgen/SisGen_Badeinso_estimaciones_pobreza_cepal.asp?idioma=I, accessed 5/3/12. 
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standard orthodox prescriptions (Cornia 2010; Madrid, Hunter and Weyland 2010; Ocampo 
and Vallejo 2012). Beyond that, there are a number of other characteristics attributed to the 
LOC policy model that constitute a marked departure from policies common in the 1990s, 
when neoliberal economic orthodoxies still held sway throughout the region. The global 
macro stance is designed to support competitiveness while at the same time protecting the 
domestic economy from the instabilities of global financial integration. These policies 
include managing real exchange rates to maintain competitiveness and stability, accumulating 
international reserves to assist in managing exchange rates, and lowering external 
indebtedness and dependence on foreign capital for borrowing (Cornia 2010; Damill and 
Frenkel 2012; Ocampo 2007). There has been less emphasis during the post 1990 period, 
however, on state-led development to promote industrialization than in the 1950s and 1960s 
(Peres 2011).5 On the fiscal front, in addition to maintaining budget balance, there is 
increased emphasis on engaging in neutral or counter-cyclical fiscal policy, though the desire 
to maintain budget balance serves as a constraint across all types of governments (Cornia 
2010; Ocampo 2007). It is not clear, however, how entirely distinctive LOC macro policy 
actually is, both because a number of non-LOC governments in the region have adopted 
similar policies, and because global economic conditions – increasing terms of trade and 
global demand for natural resource commodities, greater availability of external finance as 
interest rates have sagged in the global North, and increasing migrant remittances – have 
made “good” macro policy much easier to conduct.  
 
What may be more important, from a poverty and inequality perspective at least, is that LOC 
governments have demonstrated a willingness and aptitude for using social and labor policies 
as a vehicle for state activism. Increases in social public expenditures, and changes in the 
structure of social spending, are targeted towards lowering inequality and poverty (Barrientos 
2011; Ocampo and Vallejo 2012). Labor market policy reforms have included real minimum 
wage increases and efforts to increase formalization (Keifman and Maurizio 2012). Indeed, 
there seems to be a new willingness among a variety of governments in Latin America – not 
just LOC governments – to experiment with progressive social programs such as expanding 
and de-privatizing pension coverage and maintaining conditional cash transfers, perhaps 
reflecting widespread disappointment with the neoliberal reforms of the 1980s and 1990s, as 
well as greater confidence in government capacity and the social contract (Cornia, Gómez-
Sabaini and Martorano 2011). But there has been a lot more movement on the social than 
labor market policy front – one reason that we emphasize gender inequality in employment 
in our own analysis. 
 
                                                
5 A very recent exception is Brazil’s Greater Brazil Plan launched in August of 2011 to increase productivity 
and counter the recent decline of the industrial sector. As part of the plan, several labor-intensive and high-tech 
manufacturing industries (clothing, footwear, furniture and software) have had their payroll taxes of 20% 
abolished. Some observers have identified policies to promote global economic integration as a form of 
industrial policy. This could be termed competitiveness policy, or as the mainstream would say, “getting prices 
right,” by enlarging the space for market mechanisms to determine allocation and production decisions. From 
another perspective, however, industrial policy is an intentional effort to “get prices wrong,” using taxes, 
subsidized credit, and other incentives to move a country up the industrial ladder from commodities and labor-
intensive manufactures to the production of capital- and skill-intensive goods in the face of widespread market 
failures to inhibit private sector leadership (Amsden 1989.) A distinct feature of industrial policy is the setting 
of targets and the allocation of resources to achieve those targets.  
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Questions about the link between LOC policies, salutary economic conditions, and the 
decline in household income inequality have spurred a handful of econometric studies of the 
issue, though the results are still preliminary in that they are confined to working papers that 
have yet to undergo peer review. Though the time periods under consideration are broadly 
the same, concentrating on the 1990s and 2000s, each study employs a slightly different 
model and controls for different things, so the results are not strictly comparable. But a brief 
overview of this work gives us a sense of how economists model the macroeconomic 
dynamics of household income inequality in Latin America, an essential point of reference in 
thinking about gender.  
 
Cornia, Gómez-Sabaini and Martorano (2011) evaluate the impact of fiscal policy on the 
household income Gini index and economic growth while controlling for a number of other 
variables (including lagged dependent ones). Fiscal policy, measured as the ratio of taxes to 
GDP and the budget deficit to GDP, is positively correlated with growth in the former case 
and negatively in the latter. The upshot is that the net effect of government activity (captured 
by taxes to GDP) is good for growth, though funding those activities by running budget 
deficits is not. In the equation where the income Gini is the dependent variable, when fiscal 
policy is measured as the ratio of direct to indirect taxes, it is negatively correlated with 
inequality, so efforts to make tax systems more closely linked with income than consumption 
have had progressive income effects. When fiscal policy is measured as social protection 
spending, the effect is statistically insignificant, probably because social protection spending 
includes both social assistance and social security, and the latter is only slightly progressive as 
this spending is concentrated among formal sector workers, a group that is already well-
situated in terms of income (Cornia 2012). Of the other control variables included in the 
analysis, only GDP growth and the education Gini are statistically significant correlates of 
income inequality, while the minimum wage index is not. 
 
One set of studies explicitly evaluates the impact of political regime on household income 
inequality as measured by the Gini index, and the general conclusion is that LOC 
governments are associated with larger declines in inequality, even after controlling for 
public policies, global economic conditions, and economic structure [though the latter 
controls are the most limited] (Cornia 2010, 2012; McLeod and Lustig 2010; Birdsall, Lustig 
and McLeod 2011). There is a difference of opinion, however, on which type of LOC 
government has had a bigger impact.  
 
Cornia (2010, 2012) includes two political dummy variables in years when a LOC 
government is in power: one for populist/radical left governments (which includes 
Venezuela, Bolivia and Nicaragua), and one for social democratic governments (which 
includes Argentina, Brazil, Chile, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Panama, Paraguay and 
Uruguay). He finds that the populists had a bigger impact on redistribution than the social 
democrats, even after all the controls are added. In terms of controls, there are some 
differences in the relative importance of the variables included in the two Cornia studies, but 
the overall results are broadly consistent. Economic growth, which is treated as an 
endogenous variable, has rather modest progressive effects on household income 
distribution. Government policy, as measured by public social expenditures, the ratio of 
direct to indirect taxes, and the minimum wage index multiplied by the percent of total 
employment in the formal sector, is strongly progressive. Appreciated real effective exchange 
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rates (as they have been in the latter 2000s) are associated with higher inequality. Global 
economic conditions have had what Cornia describes as a “limited average effect” on 
declining inequality in recent years (Cornia 2012: 37), with the strongest effects coming from 
terms of trade (progressive), and much less of an impact from migrant remittances 
(progressive) and the stock of foreign direct investment (regressive). The distribution of 
education is measured somewhat differently in the two studies, but is significantly 
progressive in both. The later (2012) study also accounts for declines in the dependency ratio 
– it is somewhat surprisingly regressive – and increases in (primarily women’s) labor force 
participation, with not much of an impact. 
 
McLeod and Lustig (2010) come to a different conclusion, using an alternative categorization 
of political regime, controlling for the number of years a regime has been in power, and 
employing a different model as well as underlying microdata for the Gini. They find that 
while the social democrats (which include only Brazil, Chile and Uruguay) have a strongly 
progressive impact on the income Gini after policy and other economic controls are added, 
the left populists (which include Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua and Venezuela) 
have no statistically discernable impact. Control variables overlap somewhat with the Cornia 
papers, including public social expenditures, terms of trade and remittances, with results that 
are generally similar. Additional variables include government consumption as a share of 
GDP (regressive), per capita income (no impact), inflation (slightly regressive), merchandise 
exports as a share of GDP (progressive), and fuel exports as a percent of merchandise 
exports (regressive). In a parallel set of analyses of poverty, changes in female labor force 
participation and the real minimum wage are alternately added and found to lower poverty 
rates, but most of the global economic variables are excluded in these regressions. Using the 
same LOC categorizations and core model as McLeod and Lustig (2010) but focusing on 
income impacts by quintile, Birdsall, Lustig and McLeod (2011) find that not only are the 
social democrats more progressive than the left populists, but that the latter redistribute 
income to quintiles three and four only.  
 
Clearly, methods of categorization and modeling affect conclusions about the impact of 
policy and political regime. This is even more apparent when one considers issues of gender. 
For instance, with regard to the finding social public expenditures lower household income 
inequality, the gender effects of such policies, particularly conditional cash transfer programs, 
have been questioned (Molyneux 2007). These programs in general condition income 
supports on children’s school attendance, participation in parent-teacher meetings and 
nutrition and health education sessions, as well as doctor visits for immunizations. The 
requirement to fulfill these obligations necessitates a reorganization of household time 
patterns, with potential impacts on time to engage in paid labor. Because of gendered norms, 
it is primarily women who perform the unpaid tasks of fulfilling conditions required to 
access program payments, and thus such programs may actually reduce women’s relative 
access to income or gender equality, even as children’s status improve. So in regard to 
assessing the impact of social policy on inequality, we are reminded of the limits inherent in 
focusing solely on household-level income inequality.  
 
There is a lot in this literature that is instructive, for instance the finding that social public 
expenditures, minimum wages, the terms of trade and exports as a share of GDP all have 
progressive household income effects, while appreciated real exchange rates and fuel exports 
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as a share of GDP tend to have regressive effects. From a policy perspective at least, the 
implications of the findings on LOC governments are not clear. From a social perspective, 
turning our focus to gender differences in employment and economic opportunity will not 
only enable us to consider inequality from a different vantage point, it will also give us a 
sense of how changes in economic policy and structure have affected gendered labor 
markets as well. 
 
III. Statistical Overview of Gender Inequality in Economic Opportunities 
 
In this section we give a statistical portrait of a number of key gender variables, including 
those used in the elasticity and econometric analyses to follow. Our focus on gender 
differences in economic opportunity, as opposed to, for instance, gender inequality in 
capabilities such as health or education, is primarily because there is not much inequality to 
explain in the capabilities domain (at least as measured by the standard variables). Figure 3 
illustrates this point in the case of the female-to-male ratio of average years of education in 
the population over 15, which incorporates past as well as current gender inequality. Even 
restricting ourselves to the 1990 figures, only four countries, the Dominican Republic, 
Colombia, Venezuela and Chile have ratios lower than 0.9. If one were to instead consider 
only current secondary enrollment, women surpass men in the majority of countries during 
the entire period under consideration. Turning to our measures of economic opportunities, 
the results are quite different. 
 
Employment 
 
Figure 4 illustrates average female-to-male employment to population ratios for those aged 
15 and over in the 1990s versus the 2000s, while Figure 5 illustrates the percentage point 
change in that ratio between the two periods. We focus on employment rather than labor 
force participation because the former does not include the unemployed, an issue we 
evaluate separately. We also include regional averages for this and the other gender inequality 
variables, though these are not weighted by population. The relative employment ratios are 
generally low but increasing over time, and while men’s employment to population ratio 
declined somewhat in a number of countries, the main impetus behind the increase is 
increasing employment for women across the board. Women’s relative employment is 
generally highest in the Andean Region, followed by South America and then Central 
America and Mexico. The largest increase between the 1990s and 2000s is in the Andean 
Region, where Colombia experienced the biggest change, an increase of 0.18 percentage 
points, equivalent to an increase of 42.9 percent. It is also in the Andean Region that the 
relative employment ratio reaches its highest values, in Bolivia (0.74) and Peru (0.75). Within 
the Central America and Mexico region, El Salvador seems to be somewhat of an outlier, 
with patterns closer to those found in South America. Among South American countries, 
Chile is an outlier with much higher levels of relative employment inequality than its regional 
neighbors: in the 2000s Chilean women’s relative employment averaged 0.52, compared to a 
regional average of 0.61. 
 
It is instructive to consider the relationship between levels and changes. The correlation 
coefficient between women’s relative employment in the 1990s and the change in that ratio 
between the 1990s and 2000s is -0.15, so countries that started out with higher levels of 
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inequality in the 1990s are not changing more than countries that began with lower levels of 
inequality. A strong negative correlation would be indicative of convergence, with more 
gender unequal countries “catching up” to more gender equitable countries. This is not the 
case for the Latin American region.  
 
It is notable that the increase in the female to male employment to population ratio is only 
partially due to the increase in female employment rates. Over the last two decades, the male 
employment to population ratio fell in all of the countries in our sample, with the largest 
decline (-3.66 percentage points) occurring in Chile. For the sample as a whole, as a result, 19 
percent of gender improvements in the female to male employment rate ratio are due to 
lower male employment rates. There is, in other words, a gender conflictive component to 
improvements in gender equality in employment.  
 
Unemployment 
 
Average female-to-male unemployment rates in the 1990s and 2000s, as well as the 
percentage point change between the two periods are illustrated in Figures 6 and 7 
respectively. Unemployment, along with employment as a share of population, is one of the 
more gender unequal categories considered, with women experiencing much higher 
unemployment rates than men across both decades. Moreover, women’s relative 
unemployment actually increased in the majority of countries between the 1990s and 2000s. 
This pattern is partly attributable to the gender-differentiated unemployment effects 
associated with the 2009 economic crisis in South America, where the female-to-male 
unemployment ratio was 0.13 percentage points higher in 2008-09 than in the 2000s as a 
whole. However, in the other two regions women’s relative unemployment actually declined 
in the late 2000s relative to the decade as a whole.  
 
Looking back at Figure 6, we see an exception to the pattern of increasing relative 
unemployment for women in Central America and Mexico. The majority of countries in this 
region experienced declines in women’s relative unemployment across the two decades, 
resulting in an essentially equal regional average for the 1990s (1.46) and the 2000s (1.47) 
only because of the large increases in the ratio for Guatemala and Honduras. Women’s 
unemployment rates were actually lower than men’s in El Salvador in both decades, and in 
Guatemala in the 1990s. The result for Guatemala should be interpreted with caution, as it 
could be what we in the economics trade term a “statistical artifact.” The 1990s figure for 
Guatemala is based on only one data point from 1999, and though there have been 
significant increases in women’s unemployment throughout the 2000s relative to men’s, the 
levels are relatively low, with women’s unemployment starting at 1.4 percent in 1999 and 
increasing to 4.3 percent in 2002 before declining back down to 2.4 percent in 2006. At the 
same time, men’s unemployment declined from 2.2 to 1.5 percent between 1999 and 2006. 
Without the Guatemala outlier, the average decline in women’s relative unemployment for 
the Central America and Mexico region would have been -0.10 percentage points, a very 
substantial gender equalizing change. The patterns for El Salvador are not a statistical 
artifact; there is lots of data for both the 1990s and 2000s that all point to the fact that 
Salvadoran men have much higher unemployment rates than women throughout both 
periods. Another particular standout in Figure 6 is the Dominican Republic, where women’s 
relative unemployment is more than 2.5 times higher than men’s in both decades.  
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Informalizat ion 
 
Figures 8 and 9 illustrate the average ratio and percentage point change (respectively) of 
female-to-male urban informalization rates in the 1990s versus the 2000s. Women generally 
have higher informalization rates than men across the two decades, with the exception of the 
Dominican Republic in the 2000s (there is no data for the 1990s), and Venezuela in both 
decades. Focusing on Figure 9, the gender ratio declined everywhere except for Costa Rica, 
Guatemala, and Chile, where it increased 0.1, 0.14 and 0.04 percentage points respectively. 
The increases in Costa Rica and Guatemala are especially large considering the magnitude of 
the regional average for Central America and Mexico, -0.03. Relative to other regions, South 
American women’s relative informalization rates are generally higher, and declines between 
the decades about average. But there are some important qualifications to this portrait. The 
negative but modest declines in informalization inequality in the Central America and 
Mexico region are driven by improvements in El Salvador and Honduras. Improvements in 
the Andean Region were driven primarily by declines in inequality in Bolivia and Colombia. 
Additionally, it is important to note that Bolivia had the highest relative informalization rate 
in the 1990s, so the large decline there is very gender-equalizing by the region’s standards. 
This relationship is also reflected in the correlation coefficient between women’s relative 
informalization rates in the 1990s and the percentage point change in that ratio between the 
1990s and 2000s (-0.46), indicating that countries with higher ratios in the 1990s experienced 
larger declines in the 2000s. 
 
Wages 
 
Turning to wages, Figure 10 illustrates the female-to-male urban wage ratio for wage earners 
between the ages of 20 and 49 who work 35 or more hours a week, so among gendered 
measures of income inequality, one would expect this to be one of the more equal. Figure 11 
illustrates the percentage point difference in the average ratio between the two decades. 
Gender wage ratios are generally high and increasing, with the exception of Peru, where the 
ratio declined by 0.15 percentage points. There are few obvious differences cross-regionally, 
though the South American countries seem to exhibit more gender-based wage inequality 
than the other regions. This is particularly true if we leave Argentina out of the group; 
without Argentina, the regional average for the female relative wage is 0.73 in the 1990s and 
0.81 in the 2000s. 
 
Figure 12 illustrates another way to consider the gender wage ratio by plotting changes in 
that ratio against those for the minimum wage as a share of the average wage. Because the 
urban gender wage ratio captures only full-time workers between the ages of 20 and 49, we 
find it useful to consider its dynamics relative to those for the low-wage sector as captured 
by the minimum wage – as women are over-represented in low-wage employment (Rubery 
and Grimshaw 2011). Changes for both variables are measured as the percentage point 
difference between the average value in the 2000s and that of the 1990s. So, for instance, the 
average gender wage ratio for Argentina in the 1990s was 0.873 and for the 2000s was 0.894, 
so the percentage point difference is 0.021 – Argentina’s value on the y-axis in Figure 12. 
The average value of the minimum wage as a share of the average wage was 0.189 in the 
1990s and 0.328 in the 2000s, so the percentage point difference for the x-axis is 0.138. Our 
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first observation is that there appears to be virtually no correlation between the two series; 
the trend line is essentially flat and the correlation coefficient 0.054. But if we do not include 
the four countries where the gender wage ratio declined – Bolivia, Colombia, the Dominican 
Republic and Peru – the correlation coefficient increases to 0.71.6 So countries that 
experienced declines in gender wage inequality for full-time urban sector workers were also 
more likely to experience increases in the minimum-to-average wage ratio.  
 
Poverty  and Extreme Poverty   
 
Figures 13 and 14 show how ratio of female-to-male poverty rates changed between the 
1990s and 2000s. As in section II, we take ECLAC’s figures on poverty, which reflect 
whether or not one has the resources needed to meet basic nutritional and non-nutritional 
needs. Gendered poverty rates are figured from household surveys by simply calculating the 
number of women and men between the ages of 20 and 59 that reside in poor households.7 
Such a definition is problematic from a gender perspective because it does not account for 
the different constraints and opportunities that women and men have in their communities 
and households, and presumes an equitable intra-household distribution of income. Though 
the data’s time series availability makes it useful for comparisons, we caution readers that it 
reflects a very limited aspect of gendered poverty dynamics. That  noted, we see that women 
in almost every country have higher poverty rates than men (where they do not, as in 
Honduras during the 2000s, the rates are equal). With the exception of Costa Rica and 
Venezuela, countries in the South American region tend to have more gender inequality in 
poverty than those in other regions, with a regional average of 1.07 in the 1990s and 1.14 in 
the 2000s. As suggested by these ratios, gender inequality in poverty increased in the 2000s 
relative to the 1990s in most countries. Looking at Figure 14, we can see that of the 
countries experiencing a decline in the gender poverty ratio across the two periods, all except 
for Bolivia are located in the Central America and Mexico Region. The only countries in this 
region where the gender poverty ratio increased are Costa Rica (from 1.24 to 1.30, or 0.06 
percentage points), and Mexico (from 1.03 to 1.06, or 0.03 percentage points) – though we 
do not have data for the Dominican Republic and Panama in the 1990s. The largest 
increases in the gender poverty ratio are in South America, where during the 2000s the 
average female-to-male poverty ratio reached highs of 1.20 in Argentina and Uruguay, and 
1.19 in Chile.  
 
To investigate the impact of the global economic crisis in the late 2000s on these patterns, 
Figure 15 illustrates the difference between the average gender poverty ratio in 2009-10 and 
the average for the entire 2000s decade. If the reason for increasing ratios across the two 
decades is due to the crisis, the differences in Figure 15 will be comparable to or larger than 
those depicted in Figure 14. The crisis seems to have had the least apparent impact in 
Central America and Mexico. This conclusion is clearer if we take out the figures for the 
Dominican Republic and Panama to make the regional change comparable to that illustrated 
in Figure 14 (which does not include these countries due to lack of data). When we do, the 
                                                
6 Taking out Honduras, a positive outlier, lowers the correlation coefficient value to 0.49, still quite high. 
7 See the technical note at 
http://websie.eclac.cl/sisgen/SisGen_MuestraFicha.asp?indicador=1694&id_estudio=212 for more 
information. 
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regional average difference between female-to-male poverty rates in 2009-10 relative to the 
2000s declines from 0.03 to -0.01 percentage points, though it is important to note that 
Mexico and Costa Rica were hard hit by the crisis in terms of gender inequality in poverty. 
Turning to the Andean region, the impact of the crisis on the gender poverty ratio is clear, 
with a regional average difference of 0.04 percentage points in the late 2000s relative to the 
entire decade. Venezuela experienced the largest increase in the poverty ratio, 0.05, followed 
by Colombia with 0.03. We see the most pronounced impact of the crisis in the South 
American region, driven in particular by increasing gendered poverty ratios in Argentina, 
Chile, and to a lesser extent Brazil. 
 
Figures 16 through 18 repeat Figures 13 through 15, only with data on the ratio of female-
to-male extreme poverty, which reflects whether or not one has the resources necessary to 
fulfill basic nutritional needs only. The patterns illustrated in Figures 16 and 17 are similar to 
those in Figures 13 and 14, with increases in gender inequality for most countries as one 
moves from the 1990s to 2000s, increasing from 1.12 to 1.14 in the Central America and 
Mexico Region, 1.12 to 1.16 in the Andean Region, and 1.09 to 1.19 in South America. The 
gender ratios for extreme poverty tend to be larger than those for poverty overall. For 
instance, regional averages for the gendered extreme poverty ratio range between 0.02 to 
0.05 percentage points higher than those for poverty overall. At the individual country level, 
the difference between extreme and overall poverty range from a low of -0.04 in El Salvador 
in the 2000s (when the overall poverty ratio was 1.05 and the extreme poverty ratio 1.00), to 
a high of 0.14 in the Dominican Republic in the 2000s (when the overall poverty ratio was 
1.23 and the extreme poverty ratio 1.37). Comparing Figures 14 and 17 in particular, we also 
see that changes in the gendered poverty ratio – whether positive or negative –are 
everywhere larger in magnitude than the figures for overall poverty, with the only exception 
being Nicaragua. 
 
Looking now at Figure 18, which compares the average extreme poverty ratio in 2009-10 to 
the average for the entire 2000s, some distinctive patterns relative to the numbers on overall 
poverty in Figure 15 emerge. First, the gender inequality effect of the crisis is much more 
pronounced in the Central America and Mexico and Andean Regions when we consider 
extreme poverty instead of overall poverty. Four countries drive this result: the Dominican 
Republic, Panama, Colombia, and Venezuela, where the impact of the crisis on the gendered 
extreme poverty ratio is much more pronounced than the overall poverty ratio. Taking these 
four countries as a group, the extreme poverty ratio in 2009-10 was on average 0.07 
percentage points higher than the average for the decade as a whole, compared to a 
difference of 0.04 for overall poverty. Conversely, for the South American region, increases 
in the extreme poverty ratio (0.03 percentage points) are smaller than those for the overall 
poverty ratios (0.05 percentage points) depicted in Figure 15. And while Argentina and Chile 
experienced the largest increases in the overall gendered poverty ratio as a result of the crisis, 
Brazil is the standout in terms of extreme poverty, with a gender ratio 0.07 percentage points 
higher in 2009-2010 than the average for the 2000s (1.14 compared to 1.07). 
 
Gender and Household Inequal i ty  
 
As we noted earlier, declines in household income inequality as measured by the Gini 
coefficient may differ from trends in gender equality. We conduct a comparison of the 
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correlation of these two variables, by examining the change in the Gini coefficient from the 
1997s to 2008 (or most recent year), as compared to the change in the female/male 
employment rate ratio. If greater income equality were strongly correlated with gender 
equality in employment, we would expect to see an inverse relationship between the Gini 
and the F/M employment rate. In fact, we observe the opposite, as illustrated in Panel A of 
Figure 19. Those countries that had the strongest reduction in household income inequality 
experienced the weakest improvement in women’s relative access to employment. This does 
not mean that women are not relatively better off in terms of income equality. It does 
suggest the possibility that income equality has primarily been achieved via social transfers 
rather than through employment. To examine this, we look at changes in the F/M poverty 
rate ratio against changes in the Gini. Panel B in Figure 19 shows a weak positive 
relationship between the Gini and the F/M ratio of poverty. That said, if we consider only 
those countries that have experienced a reduction in the Gini (greater equality), it can be 
observed that there is a strong positive relationship between the Gini and F/M poverty rate. 
This suggests that whatever policies reduced household income inequality disproportionately 
reduced female poverty.  
 
Summary o f  gender inequal i ty  f indings 
• Employment .  Differences between women and men in employment-to-population 
ratios declined in the 2000s relative to the 1990s, with the average female-to-male 
ratio for the Latin American region as a whole increasing from 0.50 in the 1990s to 
0.59 in the 2000s. We found no evidence for convergence; countries with more 
employment inequality did not experience larger changes than those with less. 
• Unemployment .  Inequality in unemployment – with women facing higher 
unemployment rates than men – is among the more gender unequal categories 
considered. This type of inequality increased in the 2000s relative to the 1990s in the 
Andean and South American regions, holding essentially steady in the Central 
America and Mexico Region. Only in South America is there a clear link between the 
gendered effects of the late 2000s crisis and the increase in unemployment inequality.  
• Informalizat ion.  Women have higher rates of urban informalization than men in 
almost all the countries studied, with declines in the female-to-male informalization 
ratio in the 2000s relative to the 1990s for the majority of countries. The size of the 
informalization ratio’s decline is correlated with the level of informalization 
inequality, with countries in the South American region experiencing the largest 
declines in the ratio, but starting out at higher levels of inequality, suggesting some 
convergence. 
• Urban wage rat io .  There have been improvements between the 1990s and 2000s in 
the gender wage ratio for urban full-time workers. These changes have generally 
been more positive than those experienced in the minimum-to-average wage ratio, 
suggesting that women working full-time in the urban sector have experienced more 
improvements in wages than women working in low-wage sectors. But more direct 
research on this question must be conducted to bear this tentative conclusion out. 
• Poverty .  Women have higher poverty rates than men, a difference that increased in 
the 2000s relative to the 1990s in most countries outside the Central America and 
Mexico Region. The late 2000s crisis had little impact on poverty inequality in the 
Central America and Mexico region, with the exception of Costa Rica and Mexico, 
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which both experienced substantial increases in gender inequality in poverty during 
this period. The Andean Region also saw gendered poverty inequality rise during the 
crisis, especially Colombia and Venezuela. The largest increases in gender inequality 
in poverty that accompanied the crisis were in the South American Region, especially 
Argentina and Chile, and to a lesser extent Brazil. 
• Extreme Poverty .  Extreme poverty is generally more gender unequal than overall 
poverty, but at the same time exhibits the same broad country and time series 
patterns as overall poverty, with increases in the 2000s relative to the 1990s. The 
impact of the crisis on gender inequality was more intense in the Central America 
and Mexico and Andean Regions when we consider extreme rather than overall 
poverty inequality, primarily due to big increases in extreme poverty ratios in the 
Dominican Republic, Panama, Colombia and Venezuela. Although the impact of the 
crisis on extreme poverty inequality in the South American region is substantial, it is 
less pronounced than the effect on overall poverty inequality. 
• Gender and Household Inequal i ty .  Though both the household income Gini index 
and women’s relative employment rates have improved for most countries in the 
Latin American region since the late 1990s, those countries with the greatest declines 
in household income inequality experienced the least improvement in gendered 
employment inequality, suggesting that declines in income inequality have not been 
achieved by better employment opportunities for women. Conversely, among 
countries with declining income inequality, women’s relative poverty rates are 
strongly positively correlated with changes in the income Gini, so less household 
income inequality is associated with lower rates of gendered poverty inequality. This 
indicates that the policies or circumstances causing decreases in income equality also 
disproportionately reduced female poverty. 
 
IV. The Responsiveness of Employment to Economic Growth 
In this section we consider the relationship between economic growth and employment 
from a gender-aware perspective by estimating the growth elasticity of employment for 
women and men. While economic growth may be necessary for substantial improvements in 
development and declines in poverty, it is not sufficient; it is the “employment nexus” that 
enables individuals to participate in the benefits of growth in a sustained, transformative 
manner (Osmani 2004; Van der Hoeven and Lubker 2006). One way to think about this is in 
terms of the elasticity of employment to growth, which refers to the extent to which an 
increase in production enhances both the quantity and quality of employment. This elasticity 
involves both demand and supply side factors. On the demand side, the responsiveness of 
gendered employment to growth will depend on: 1) the sectoral composition of output, or 
the extent to which the growth of output is concentrated in more labor-intensive sectors, 
and the gender composition of those sectors; 2) the labor intensity of the techniques used in 
growing sectors; and 3) the extent to which the domestic and international terms of trade 
improve for workers in labor-intensive sectors, or whether this type of employment is 
associated with increases in real wages (Osmani 2004). On the supply side, even when 
growth does generate labor demand, for that increased demand to result in improved living 
standards and non-conflictive declines in gender inequality, both women and men have to be 
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situated to take advantage of these opportunities, what Osmani calls the “integrability factor” 
(Osmani 2004; 2006).8  
Because of data availability, here we focus on the relationship between growth and 
employment generation as measured by the number of women and men aged 15 and older 
who are employed (see the data appendix for data computation details). A useful way to 
think about these dynamics, and what we miss by not dealing directly with employment 
quality as well as quantity, is illustrated by equation 1, which gives the arithmetic identity that 
income or output (Y) is, by definition, equal to employment (E) multiplied by labor 
productivity (q, which equals output divided by employment). If we consider changes in 
these variables, as represented by delta (! ) in equation (2), then we see that changes in 
output are distributed between changes in employment and changes in productivity.9 If the 
responsiveness of employment to economic growth declines, productivity improvements, 
which are ultimately necessary to increase wages and improve living standards, will have 
negative effects on labor demand.  
(1) Y = Eq  
(2) !Y = !E + !q  
We econometrically estimate the growth elasticity of employment based on  
(3) lnEit =! i + " lnYit + # it  
 
where lnEit  is the natural log of employment in country i in year t, lnYit  is the natural log of 
real income in local currency units for country i in year t, ! i  is the country-specific intercept, 
and ! it  the error term. In this form, the coefficient estimate of !  can be interpreted as the 
growth elasticity of employment – the percent change in employment that results from a one 
percent change in GDP. We run separate regressions for female and male employment, as 
well as consider gender differences by industrial structure and time period. 
 
Because economic structure is a key determinant of employment elasticity, in addition to 
estimating equation (3) for the Latin American region as a whole, we run separate 
regressions for countries grouped according to their industrial and trade structures. We 
constructed three indices in order to categorize countries. A fuel and ores index was 
calculated as the sum of the natural logs of: 1) exports as a percent of GDP, 2) the ratio of 
the share of fuel and ores to manufactured exports, and 3) the ratio of manufactured imports 
to exports. The latter contributes to an index that allows countries primarily intensive in fuel 
and ores to be ranked above those with manufacturing expertise. An agricultural index was 
constructed in a similar fashion with the exception that the second component is the ratio of 
the share of agriculture value added in GDP to share of manufacturing value added in GDP. 
Finally, a manufacturing index was constructed as the sum of the natural logarithm of two 
                                                
8 This paragraph is based on Braunstein (2012: 7-8). 
9 This perspective is drawn from Kapsos (2005). 
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components: 1) the ratio of manufacturing exports as a share of merchandise exports to the 
sum of fuel, ore, and agricultural export shares in merchandise exports, and 2) the ratio of 
manufactured exports to imports. Annual values of the indices were calculated and then 
summed over the time period 1990 to 2010. Countries with average indices that ranked 
above the mean for all countries were categorized as intensive in that industry (no country 
could be ranked as intensive in more than one industry). For example, the mean 
manufacturing index, averaged across countries and over the time period 1990 to 2010, is 
7.65. Countries with manufacturing indices greater than 7.65 were grouped as 
manufacturing-intensive economies. A similar process was used to categorize countries as 
fuel and ore intensive and agricultural economies. Using this method, Guatemala, Honduras, 
Nicaragua, and Paraguay are categorized as agricultural economies; Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, 
Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela are categorized as fuel and ore intensive economies, and the 
remainder are in the manufacturing group. A component country list of these groups is 
provided in Table 4. 
Table 5 lists gender-specific elasticity estimates and their female-to-male ratios for the Latin 
American region as a whole and countries grouped according to the industrial and trade 
structure indices. Time periods considered include 1991-2010 and shorter spans that 
correspond to different growth periods (the expansionary years 1991-97, the “lost half-
decade” 1998-2002, and 2003-2010). We also present GDP growth for the country group 
and period under consideration so readers can get a sense of how much growth and 
employment actually changed. Where estimates were not statistically significant at the 10 
percent level or above, the elasticity is given in italics.10  
Looking first at the Latin American region estimates, we see that both female and male 
employment is inelastic with respect to growth. That is, a one percent increase (decrease) in 
GDP results in a less than one percent increase (decrease) in employment for both women 
and men. However, women’s employment is much more responsive to growth than men’s. 
In the 1991-2010 period, a one percent increase in GDP was associated with a 0.95 percent 
increase in women’s employment and a 0.54 percent increase in men’s, resulting in a female-
to-male elasticity ratio of 1.76. Looking at the three sub-periods qualifies this picture 
substantially, however. The elasticity of women’s employment declined from 0.87 in the 
1991-97 period to 0.67 in the 2003-2010 period, while men’s has remained virtually the same 
at 0.46 and 0.44 respectively. These patterns are reflected by a decline in the female-to-male 
employment elasticity ratio from 1.89 in the early 1990s to 1.52 in the latter 2000s. 
Elasticities for both women and men are lowest in the low growth years of 1998-2002, 
indicating that what growth there was during this period created very little employment. 
Similar results are presented in Kapsos (2005). In sum, women’s employment, while still 
more responsive to economic growth than men’s employment, has become less responsive 
to growth in the 2000s relative to the 1990s, both absolutely and relative to men. On the 
other hand, men’s elasticities have remained fairly constant across the two decades, after a 
dip in the 1998-2002 period. So for women at least, productivity improvements have 
become increasingly associated with declines in labor demand. 
                                                
10 All of the estimates in Table 5 are highly significant. Only when we get to Table 6 does statistical significance 
decline anywhere below a 90 percent confidence interval. 
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One issue to consider more carefully is the point that women across Latin America have 
experienced significant increases in labor force participation over the period, while men have 
experienced slight declines: mean labor force participation rates for women increased from 
40.0 to 51.8 percent between 1990 and 2010, while for men it declined slightly from 82.0 to 
80.7 percent.11 Figure 20 illustrates these patterns in terms of employment to population 
ratios, the variable used for the multivariate econometric analysis to follow, with specific 
percentages given in 1991, 1997, 2003 and 2010 to correspond with the sub-periods in Table 
5. Since female employment participation increased so much, the higher elasticities for 
women could be driven by a secular shift in female labor supply behavior rather than gender 
differences in labor demand induced by growth. The female employment to population ratio 
increased from 35.8 to 40.1 percent between 1991 and 1997, an increase of 4.3 percentage 
points, and from 42.6 to 47.5 percent between 2003 and 2010, an increase of 4.9 percentage 
points. Given that the increase in the early period is similar to that in the later period, the 
decline in the growth elasticity of women’s employment across the two periods does not 
seem to be driven by a slowdown in women’s employment participation. 
Another way to assess the role of labor supply is by controlling for the size of the labor force 
in the econometric estimates of elasticity, which we do in Table 6, still limiting the discussion 
to the results for the Latin American region as a whole. We focus on relative magnitudes and 
changes over time in the discussion of Table 6 – as opposed to absolute values – because 
these estimates are not true elasticities as they are defined above, but rather an indication of 
the relative importance of economic participation in the elasticity estimates. The higher the 
elasticity in Table 6 relative to that estimated in Table 5, the less important labor supply is in 
generating employment. While the estimated elasticities are predictably much lower than 
those in Table 5, women’s employment is still more elastic than men’s employment. Turning 
to the sub-periods, the 2003-2010 period looks better in terms of the employment 
generation capacity of growth relative to the 1990-97 period once we control for labor 
supply. But all this means is that employment generation in the 1990s was more sensitive to 
participation rates, a finding consistent with our conclusion based on considering changes in 
participation rates alone. 
Now we turn to the results for countries grouped according to industrial structure, beginning 
with manufacturing economies in Table 5. Somewhat surprisingly, elasticities are lower in 
this group than the region as a whole, as well as lower than the other two groups, economies 
characterized by heavy dependence on fuel and ores and agriculture. For the 1991-2010 
period, the growth elasticity of employment is 0.82 for women and 0.46 for men, with a 
female-to-male ratio of 1.78. Though both estimates are lower than those for the whole 
region, the gender ratio is essentially the same. Turning to the estimates for the three sub-
periods, elasticities are markedly lower especially for women but also men, and there is less 
change over time when we consider them relative to those for the Latin American region as 
a whole. Comparing the 1991-97 and 2003-10 periods, the elasticity for women goes from 
0.66 to 0.60, and for men from 0.36 to 0.38, resulting in a decline of the female-to-male 
elasticity ratio from 1.83 to 1.58. So while the gender gap in elasticities is comparable to 
those estimated for the entire Latin American region, the responsiveness of employment to 
growth is lower. This may seem counterintuitive in that it is sometimes presumed that 
                                                
11 Authors’ calculations based on data from WDI database. 
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economies characterized by large manufacturing sectors are more effective at producing jobs. 
But a higher proportion of growth in this group is getting captured by increases in 
productivity. Controlling for labor supply, as illustrated in Table 6, gives a slightly different 
picture. The results in Table 6 fall in line with those for the region as a whole, with little 
responsiveness of employment to growth in the 1990s once we control for labor supply, 
shifting to stronger elasticities in the 2003-10 period. This result is consistent with that found 
for the region, with employment becoming less responsive to increases in labor force 
participation in the latter 2000s, especially for women.  
Going back to Table 5 and considering the 1991-2010 results for the fuel and ores group, we 
see that elasticities are high for women (1.03) but not so much for men (0.46) relative to the 
Latin American region and the other country groups. As we move sequentially through the 
three sub-periods elasticities decline, though much more for women than for men, with 
female elasticity ending up at 0.62 and men’s at 0.43 for the 2003-2010 period. Thus the 
gender gap decreases quite a bit, with the female-to-male elasticity ratio declining from 2.12 
in the 1991-97 period to 1.44 in the 2003-2010 period. It is also interesting to note that 
female elasticity results for the last period are in line with the Latin American region and the 
manufacturing group. What happened in this group that women’s employment elasticity 
declined so much? One thing to consider is that female employment to population ratios 
increased much more in this region than elsewhere. In 1991, the female employment rate 
was 34.8 percent. By 2002, it had increased to 46.6 percent, ending up in 2010 at 51.4 
percent. The elasticity estimates that control for labor supply in Table 6 also suggest that 
increasing participation is part of the explanation. According to these results, the share of 
employment growth associated with increases in labor supply is more constant across the 
three periods, and with so many women entering the labor market in the 1990s, employment 
elasticities are consequently higher.  
Turning now to the primarily agricultural group, Table 5 indicates that this group hosts by 
far the highest elasticities for both women and men. Over the entire 1991-2010 period, for 
every one percent increase in GDP growth women’s employment expanded 1.12 percent 
and men’s 0.70 percent, giving a female-to-male elasticity ratio of 1.60, the lowest value in 
the 1991-2010 column. Looking across the sub-periods, we don’t see a decline in the 
responsiveness of employment to growth in the 2003-2010 period relative to the early 1990s. 
In fact, female elasticity is slightly lower in the earlier than the latter period (1.05 versus 1.09), 
while men’s stays virtually the same (0.72 versus 0.71), as reflected by the increase in the 
female-to-male elasticity ratio (1.46 versus 1.54). Still, we do see the same type of elasticity 
decline in the middle period (1998-2002) witnessed in the other country groups. Note, 
however, that GDP growth is lower during booms and higher during busts than in the other 
groups, so even though elasticities are higher, employment creation is more constant because 
growth is less volatile. The results for the agricultural country group listed in Table 6 when 
we control for labor supply show elasticities that are somewhat more in line with other 
groups and the region as a whole, though the estimates for the 1991-97 period are not 
statistically significant, and those for women in the 1991-2010 are quite low. Comparing the 
sub-periods indicates that economic participation is less important in the 2003-2010 for 
employment growth than in earlier periods, as is the case for the other country groups. In 
addition, the relatively large magnitudes recorded in Table 5 indicate that economic 
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participation has an important role to play in generating employment in agricultural countries 
overall, particularly among women. 
As a detail reference, Table 7 gives elasticity estimates by specific country for 1991-2010 for 
the entire 1991-2010 period (shorter spans involve too few observations to produce 
meaningful results). In eight out of the 20 counties, the responsiveness of female 
employment to growth is greater than one, meaning that a one percent increase in growth 
raises female employment by more than one percent. Colombia has the highest elasticity for 
women (1.66), but not for men (0.71), giving one of the highest values in the female-to-male 
elasticity ratio of 2.34. Paraguay boasts the highest elasticity for men at 1.00, with a similarly 
high value for women (1.25), resulting in the lowest gender elasticity ratio in the table, 1.25. 
Table 8 repeats these estimates while controlling for the size of the labor force, which results 
in about half of the estimates losing their statistical significance.  The big standout in this 
table is the Dominican Republic, where controlling for labor supply substantially increases the 
responsiveness of female employment to economic growth (from 0.66 in Table 7 to 0.79 in 
Table 8), the only case in this study to do so, while decreasing it for men. 
The last group of elasticity estimates in Table 9 include formal employment only based on 
estimates of the percent of the urban population engaged in informal sector work. These 
elasticities are not strictly comparable to the prior estimates because we do not have 
observations for all years, and in general there are more observations for the 2000s than the 
1990s. Focusing on the 2003-2010 period (which give the most robust estimates), in 
comparison to Table 5 we see that elasticities on formal employment are generally higher 
than those for overall employment. This is particularly salient in the case of men’s 
employment in the agricultural group, where the elasticity of formal employment is 1.7 in 
Table 9 compared to 0.71 for total employment in Table 5. These results make sense in that 
people have to earn some sort of income to survive, and so informal employment is less 
sensitive to the ups and downs of the business cycle than formal employment, at least in 
those countries where informal employment serves as a type of residual employment when 
opportunities are few in the formal sector. Interestingly, the differences between formal and 
total employment elasticities are smallest for the manufacturing country group, which is 
consistent with an interpretation that informal employment is not a residual source of 
employment in this group, but rather integrated with the economy in ways that parallel the 
behavior of formal employment. 
Summary o f  e last i c i ty  resul ts  
• The growth elasticity of employment is higher for women than for men. For the 
Latin American region as a whole during the 1991-2010 time period, elasticities were 
0.95 for women and 0.54 for men. 
• Both women and men experienced lower elasticities in the 2000s than the 1990s, so 
there is less employment generation associated with growth in the 2000s relative to 
the 1990s. The one exception is in the agricultural country group, where elasticities 
remained roughly constant. 
• Though elasticities for both female and male employment are declining over time, 
women’s is falling faster than men’s, resulting in an average female-to-male elasticity 
ratio of about 1.7 in the 1990s and 1.5 in the latter 2000s. 
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• The lowest elasticities for both women and men are in the manufacturing country 
group, with the highest in the agricultural country group. 
• The growth elasticity of employment is more sensitive to labor supply effects in the 
1990s than the 2000s, suggesting some sort of structural change (a decline, according 
to our estimates) in the employment-generating capacity of labor supply. 
• Formal employment is more responsive to changes in growth than total employment, 
especially in the agricultural country group. 
 
V.  Econometric Analysis 
 
A.  Model 
 
We now turn to an exploration of the effect of macro-level variables on gender equality 
using regression analysis. One set of regressions analyzes the determinants of the ratio of 
female to male employment rates and separately, female and male employment rates. In a 
second set of regressions, we evaluate the determinants of female and male unemployment 
rates, as well as the female to male ratio.12 We test the effect on gender equality of three sets 
of variables: 1) social and employment policies; 2) macroeconomic policies; and 3) measures 
of economic structure. One of the challenges in this type of analysis is potential 
multicollinearity – some of the independent variables may be correlated with each other, 
making it difficult to isolate the individual effects of the independent variables. Thus, for 
example, capital account liberalization may lead to an increase in private capital flows, but 
this will also have an effect on the real exchange rate. Simultaneous inclusion of private 
capital flows and exchange rates as independent variables may therefore result in 
insignificant coefficients on one or both variables because the data are not able to isolate the 
impact of each of these variables. This is in part due to the nature of macroeconomic 
variables, and a function of the limited time series data available (for example, quarterly data 
would have been preferable). One way we address this is by estimating a parsimonious 
reduced form equation to focus on the key macro phenomena that may contribute to 
gendered outcomes in employment and unemployment.  
 
We employ two measures of social and employment policy: social public expenditures made 
by central governments as a share of GDP and the minimum wage relative to the average 
monthly wage. The motivation for including these two explanatory variables is as follows. 
Social expenditures that level gender inequalities may improve women’s relative educational 
attainment and health, permitting greater participation in employment and higher wages.  
                                                
12 The employment-to-population ratio and the unemployment rate are inversely related but are not perfectly 
correlated. The first is a measure of the proportion of the working age population that is employed (whether or 
not a person declares him or herself to be an active labor market participant). The unemployment rate is a 
measure of the proportion of labor market participants who cannot find employment. There is a gender 
dimension to these two variables. Women are less likely than men to be in the labor force due to gender norms, 
such as household responsibilities. As a result, the female to male unemployment rate may be artificially lower 
than it would otherwise be. The female-to-male employment rate ratio captures differences in women’s and 
men’s access to work for the working age population, regardless of how a person defines their labor market 
status. It is therefore a more precise measure of gender differences in employment (though it tells us nothing 
about the quality of that work, including the pay).  
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Minimum wage increases may be gender-equalizing since women are over-represented in low 
wage employment (Rubery and Grimshaw 2011). This can be a particularly useful tool in the 
face of gender job segregation shaped by norms and stereotypes that reduces women’s 
bargaining power vis-à-vis employers relative to that of men. Of course, mainstream theory 
argues that higher minimum wages can lead to employment losses since higher wages reduce 
the demand for labor. There is, however, some empirical evidence to the contrary. That 
research suggests that higher minimum wages at worst have negligible effects and may even 
have positive effects on employment, resulting from the demand-side stimulus of higher 
wages and efficiency wage effects. Rather than using the minimum wage index as an 
explanatory variable, we employ a measure of the minimum wage relative to the average 
monthly wage as an explanatory variable. We anticipate that the higher the minimum wage 
relative to the average monthly wage, the stronger the effect on pay, and potentially on 
women’s relative employment.  
 
Our macro policy variables are the real effective exchange rate (REER), the real interest rate 
(the nominal lending rate minus the rate of inflation), and public investment as a share of 
GDP.13 Monetary policies and explicit exchange rate policies affect the REER, with a 
depreciation (an increase in the REER) stimulating demand for export goods and reducing 
import demand. Gender equality in employment may be positively affected by an increase in 
the REER if resulting job increases are in sectors in which women are more concentrated or 
simply as a result of an economy-wide demand stimulus that generates female-intensive 
employment expansion.14  
 
Monetary policy also affects the real interest rate. Both the lending rate and the rate of 
inflation respond to changes in the policy interest rate.15 A higher real interest rate can lower 
private investment since the cost of borrowing rises, thereby contributing to a decline in 
employment. Whether such effects are gendered or not depends in part on the type of 
gender job segregation that exists. If men are more concentrated in interest-rate sensitive 
industries (such as capital-intensive industries), men’s employment may be more strongly 
affected than women’s. 
 
Finally, under the category of macroeconomic policy, we examine the effect of public 
investment. Public investments in physical infrastructure such as electricity, water and 
sanitation, and transportation may have a significant impact on gendered access to 
                                                
13Previous studies have included the fiscal balance as an explanatory variable. Because this variable is correlated 
with one of our independent variables, GDP growth, and due to the limited time series available, we have 
chosen not to include this variable in our regressions. We also ran regressions that included this variable in 
place of GDP and it was not statistically significant.   
14 Although we do not evaluate formal-informal sector effects, it is useful to note that an increase or 
depreciation in the REER can have an ambiguous effect on gender concentration in the informal sector. This is 
because some informal jobs are complementary to formal sector jobs, with the manufacturing informal sector 
serving as a flexible and contingent source of labor that fluctuates with export demand. Also, a depreciation 
that stimulates export demand may be more likely to lead to an increase in informal sector employment if 
export demand is seen as volatile and temporary, discouraging the incentive to hire workers on formal 
contracts.  
15 The real interest rate then collapses the effects both of changes in the money supply (or policy interest rate) 
as well as the effects of monetary policy on inflation. In future research with an extended time series, it would 
be useful to disaggregate these two components of monetary policy to assess their labor market effects. 
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employment if such investments reduce women’s time poverty and care burden (Agénor and 
Canuto (2012). For Guatemala, Gammage (2010) finds evidence that access to piped-in 
water and to the electric grid reduces the probability of being both time and income poor, 
with clear gender implications. 
 
A country’s structure of production also has gender implications due to gender norms and 
stereotypes that contribute to industrial and occupational gender job segregation. A large 
gender-aware literature documents the rise in the female share of employment as economies 
shift production to labor-intensive manufactures. Women are under-represented as 
employees in capital-intensive industries such as mining and petroleum-related production 
activities. Further, as an economy industrially upgrades, there is some recent evidence of a 
defeminization of manufacturing employment (Tejani and Milberg 2010). We use two 
explanatory variables to capture these effects. First, we include the ratio of manufacturing 
exports to imports as an explanatory variable, with the ratio assumed to rise as an economy 
moves up the industrial ladder.16 Second, we use the share of fuel and ores as a percentage of 
exports.17 Theoretically, we would anticipate that as the share of fuels and ores in exports 
rises, male employment outcomes would improve more than women’s.  
 
The terms of trade, which reflect the structure of imports and exports and their price and 
income elasticities, can have income effects generally. Commodity price booms improve a 
country’s terms of trade – making it possible to import more goods with a given level of 
exports. They can also raise the incomes of workers employed in sectors that are 
experiencing booms, in particular agriculture. To the extent that women differentially benefit, 
an improvement in the terms of trade can be gender equalizing. The employment effects, 
however, are ambiguous. Insofar as an improvement in the terms of trade stimulates 
aggregate demand for domestically produced labor-intensive goods, women may 
differentially benefit from increased employment in the economy as a whole or in the 
agricultural sector. On the other hand, an improvement in the terms of trade may stimulate 
investment in male-dominated extractive industries. 
 
Finally, we include GDP growth as an explanatory variable. Some authors argue growth is 
gender equalizing (World Bank 2012), although there is contrary evidence for Latin America 
and Asia (Seguino 2003, 2007). Growth could also be equalizing if women more than men 
gain access to newly created jobs. There is evidence of a two-way causality between gender 
inequality and growth, with the strength and direction of those relationships mediated by the 
structure of an economy and the pattern of gender job segregation, an issue that becomes 
important for the econometric analysis and is discussed in more detail below (Costa, Silva, 
and Vaz 2009; Klasen and Lamanna 2009; Seguino 2010). 18  
                                                
16 An alternative measure is per capita GDP per worker, but country limitations on the availability of these data 
precluded its use as an explanatory variable in our regressions. 
17 We do not have data on fuel and ores as a percentage of GDP, and therefore use exports of these goods as a 
second-best proxy.  
18 It would have been useful to include determinants of female and male labor supply in our model, as 
measured by the age dependency ratio (the ratio of young and old to working age population). The dependency 
ratio is a proxy measure of care burdens, which if differentially borne by women, can affect their ability to 
participate in paid labor markets. This variable, however, performed poorly and counter-intuitively, a finding 
also noted by Cornia, et al (2010). This may be because the variable is poorly measured, or because our time 
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B.  Data 
 
A full accounting of data sources is provided in the Data Appendix. We have already given 
an overview of the employment and unemployment variables in section III. Here we limit 
the discussion to the macroeconomic policy and structure variables, as well as the statistical 
properties of the data as they pertain to the econometric analysis to follow. 
 
Beginning with the social and employment policy variables, Figures 21 and 22 give a sense of 
the nearly universal increase in central governments’ social public spending in the 2000s 
relative to the 1990s, with Ecuador being the only country where this type of spending as a 
share of GDP declined. Interestingly, it was in the Central America and Mexico Region that 
we see the largest average increase in social spending across the two decades.  
 
Figure 23 illustrates the real monthly minimum wage relative to the average monthly wage by 
country and region, contrasting the average ratio in the 1990s with that of the 2000s. While 
most countries did experience an increase in this ratio, the countries with lower minimum 
wages in the 1990s did tend to experience larger percentage point increases in the minimum-
to-average wage ratio across the two decades. This is reflected by the correlation coefficient 
– -0.36 – between the average ratio in the 1990s and the percentage point change between 
the 1990s and the 2000s. 
 
In terms of the macroeconomic policy variables, Figure 24 shows the course of the REER 
index by country and region. We can see that the early 1990s were characterized by real 
exchange rate appreciation for most countries (as illustrated by declines in the index), 
depreciating or stable trajectories beginning in the late 1990s, and a tendency towards some 
appreciation in the later half of the 2000s – though this pattern is much more pronounced in 
South America and the Andean Region than in Central America and Mexico. The policy 
stance underlying these patterns shifted in the late 1990s and early 2000s, when most 
countries adopted managed exchange rate regimes designed to maintain a competitive real 
exchange rate and to avoid large appreciations (Damill and Frenkel 2012). 
 
Figure 25 illustrates real interest rate averages for different eras of economic growth: the 
early 1990s (1990-97), the “half-lost decade” (1998-2002), the boom of the 2000s (2003-08), 
and the most recent global crisis and beginning of recovery (2009-2010). High real interest 
rates are sometimes used as a monetary policy lever to help manage inflation and keep 
globally mobile capital at home, but such a policy stance can come at the cost of growth and 
employment if it inhibits investment due to the consequent higher costs of borrowing. It is 
generally the case that real interest rates were lower in the 2000s than the 1990s, indicating a 
better environment for investment. For a number of countries the difference between the 
two decades is substantial. Comparing the boom years 1990-97 with 2003-08, we see lower 
                                                                                                                                            
series is so short. It was not possible to transform the dependency ratio in such a way as to obtain plausible 
coefficient estimates on this and other variables, and we therefore decided not to include it in our model, 
absent a better measure of care burdens. It should be noted, therefore, that our estimates may suffer from 
omitted variable bias and should be viewed with caution. 
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real interest rates in the 2000s in all countries for which we have data except for Guatemala, 
Honduras and Paraguay. Some of these differences are very large. Between the two boom 
periods, real interest rates declined more than 50 percent in Mexico, Nicaragua, Bolivia, 
Ecuador, Argentina, Chile and Uruguay. However, real interest rates are still relatively high in 
a number of countries, exceeding 10 percent in 2009-10 in the Dominican Republic, 
Honduras, Peru, Brazil and Paraguay.  
 
Figure 26 illustrates public investment as a share of GDP by country, contrasting the average 
for 1990-94 with 2006-2010. Multi-year averages are used to smooth out what can be 
substantial fluctuations from year to year, such as when the government undertakes a large 
capital improvement project. Also note that this ratio captures only capital improvements, 
such as land improvements, the building of roads, schools, or health and sanitation facilities. 
Clearly, there are other types of public spending that one could reasonably argue should be 
counted as investment, such as subsidies for student loans, daycare, or other direct 
investments in human capital. Thus, this data only measures the role of public investments in 
physical capital, missing the other types of investments in human capital. Though we do not 
have data on public investment for Chile, the other countries in South America tend to have 
lower levels of public investment as a share of GDP in both the early 1990s and late 2000s, 
topping out in the 2000s with Paraguay at 3.7 percent and Uruguay at 4.9 percent. We find 
the highest public investment shares in the latter 2000s in the Andean Region, led by 
Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia, with public investment shares of 12.5, 10.1 and 9.3 percent 
respectively. In Central America and Mexico, four out of the seven countries for which we 
have data experienced declines in public investment as a share of GDP: Costa Rica, El 
Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua. The average share for these four in the latter period is 
3.5 percent. Of those in this region hosting increases in public investment in the late 2000s, 
Guatemala, Mexico, and Panama, the average share is 4.6 percent.  
 
An indicator of economic structure that reflects the degree of industrial upgrading is the 
ratio of manufactured exports to manufactured imports. As a country moves up the 
industrial ladder, we would expect that ratio to rise. A caveat is that semi-industrialized 
economies continue to be dependent on imported capital and high-tech goods and so the 
rise in this ratio may in fact be very slow over time. The data in Figure 27 by region show a 
downward trend for most countries in the Central American region and South America, 
exceptions being Mexico, Chile, and Argentina. In contrast, here too the Andean region 
shows signs of higher value-added exports (as evidenced by the rise of manufactures in 
exports) relative to imports.  
 
Figure 28 illustrates the average share of fuel and ores in merchandise exports for the entire 
1990-2010 period by country. While the magnitude of this ratio in particular countries does 
vary over time (sometimes as a result of changes in the denominator, merchandise exports), 
we give an average for the whole period only to remind readers of the broad structural 
differences across countries. Comparing these ratios with the industrial groupings in Table 4, 
we see that the fuel and ores group, which includes Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru 
and Venezuela also have the highest ratios in Figure 28, with averages ranging from a low of 
38 percent in Colombia to a high of 87.4 percent in Venezuela. The next category of 
countries – roughly in the 15 percent range – includes Mexico, Argentina and Brazil. That 
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leaves all the countries in Central America, and Paraguay and Uruguay, with ratios that range 
between a low of 0.6 percent in Paraguay to a high of 6.1 percent in Guatemala. 
 
Figure 29 explores secular trends in the terms of trade by region. As we noted, 
improvements in the terms of trade can improve the incomes of workers employed in 
sectors where export prices are rising. How gender equality is affected depends on a 
country’s gendered pattern of employment concentration. A second avenue by which gender 
equality may be affected is via the effect on government revenues, with commodity price 
booms leading to increases in public sector revenues and expenditures, which may or may 
not be gender-equalizing. Commodity price increases in the 2000s have led to improvements 
in the terms of trade in some countries in all regions (Figure 29). The most pronounced 
improvements have been in the Andean region, with Venezuelan gains substantially 
outpacing those of other countries. In South America, too, there have been some 
improvements, though they are modest, with the exception of Chile. Finally, the terms of 
trade in Central America and Mexico show little change since the early 1990s.  
 
It is useful to note trends in trade openness, which is viewed by some scholars as a stimulus 
to productivity growth. Whatever the effect of trade openness on productivity growth, if it 
worsens the current account deficit, it is a drag on short-run GDP growth and thus 
employment. Figure 30 shows the change in the share of trade in GDP (exports plus 
imports) plotted against the current account surplus (deficit). The data in that figure show a 
correlation between the expansion of trade as a share of GDP and the current account 
deficit Net gender employment effects are thus ambiguous a priori. This is because expansion 
of trade may create jobs in female-dominated sectors but declines in job availability due to a 
rise in imports that may swamp any positive export effects on employment. 
 
Finally, while we do not use the dependency ratio in our regressions, it is useful to observe 
their trends from 1990 to 2010 (Figure 31). All countries have experienced a decline in 
dependency ratios. Plotting the average annual decline against the average dependency ratio, 
we observe that those countries with the highest average ratios also experienced the largest 
declines.  
 
Diagnost i cs  
  
Most variables were converted into natural logs for ease of comparison of coefficients. Real 
interest rates and GDP growth were not so converted since these variables take on negative 
values. We tested all the variables in our panel for unit roots using Fisher-type panel unit 
root tests with an augmented Dickey-Fuller specification applied to the individual countries. 
We used the Fisher test because our panel is slightly unbalanced due to occasional missing 
observations. The Fisher test assumes an AR(1) process in the underlying Dickey-Fuller test 
specification. The Fisher test was performed without and with a deterministic time trend. All 
transformed variables were found to be stationary (results available on request).  
 
C.  Estimation Strategy 
 
To explore the determinants of gendered labor market outcomes in Latin America for the 
period 1990-2010, we employ two estimation techniques: simple OLS and two stage least 
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squares (2SLS). For the OLS estimates, we use a fixed effects panel estimation technique to 
control for country-specific factors not otherwise captured in our independent variables that 
may influence gender outcomes. Fixed effects panel data (alternatively termed pooled cross-
sectional data) analysis allows us to study the effect of our independent variables over time, 
controlling for country-specific differences not captured by our independent variables. (In 
other words, the intercept term is allowed to vary by country).19  
 
Formally, the model we test is of the form: 
 
(4) Genderit =! + "Xit + µi + # it  
 
where Gender is our gender variable of interest in country i and year t; X is a vector of the 
nine independent variables identified in the previous discussion; µ is the time-invariant 
country fixed effect; and ε is the error term. This approach is useful in ascertaining whether 
there are common effects of the independent variables across this group of countries. It 
should be noted, however, that even where we find no evidence of common effects (as 
when a coefficient is statistically insignificant), independent variables may have notable 
effects on individual countries and thus a group-wise analysis does not preclude the 
usefulness of country-level analyses. That said, to the extent we find common effects 
(statistically significant coefficients on our independent variables), this allows us to generalize 
regionally about the gender effects of the independent variables.   
 
One potential problem with the fixed effects model we have specified is that the growth rate 
of GDP is itself influenced by gender inequality and by several independent variables 
(including the real interest and exchange rates). We therefore use two-stage least squares 
(2SLS) to account for the endogeneity of GDP growth. The instruments for the growth rate 
of GDP are the growth rate of gross fixed capital formation (public and private), the terms 
of trade (log), the real exchange rate (log), the real interest rate, and the female share of the 
labor force (log). The latter variable is included due to evidence that gender equality in labor 
force participation exerts a positive effect on GDP growth based on a selection distortion 
argument – greater gender balance in labor force participation draws more heavily from the 
available pool of talent, thus stimulating efficiency and national income growth (Costa, Silva, 
and Vaz 2009; Klasen and Lamanna 2009). 
 
D.  Discussion of Results 
 
Table 10 shows regression results for female-to-male employment, and female and male 
employment separately, while Table 12 reports results for the unemployment rate ratio, 
female unemployment, and male unemployment.  We report fixed effect and 2SLS 
regression results that include all of our independent variables with the exception of public 
investment and fuel and ores as a percent of exports. We then report regression results that 
include these latter two variables. The reason we report results in this way is that there are a 
                                                
19 We report robust standard errors, and F-tests reveal in all cases that the fixed effect model is better than a 
pooled OLS model (with no country-specific intercepts). All 2SLS regressions pass the test for validity of 
instruments. 
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large number of missing observations for the latter two variables, and two countries drop 
out of our regressions, Chile and the Dominican Republic. A comparison of the results from 
the two sets of regressions provides some information on the robustness of our results.  
 
Beginning with the results for employment, social spending has a positive effect on relative 
employment rates in all regressions and the size of this effect is quite large as compared to 
the coefficients on the other variables. Specifically, a ten percent increase in social spending 
as a share of GDP raises the female to male employment rate ratio between 1.2 to 3.2 
percent. One of the implications of this result is that, despite social programs that may 
increase women’s care burden, social spending overall does not appear to inhibit their 
relative employment. The minimum wage also has a positive and significant effect on this 
ratio in all but one equation, though the size of that effect is smaller than social spending. 
This contradicts neoclassical hypotheses that higher minimum wages lead to employment 
losses for the lowest wage earners, in this case women.20 It is notable that GDP growth itself 
has an insignificant effect on female relative employment. Whereas in Asian labor-intensive 
export manufacturing economies, women’s share of employment tends to rise with growth, 
this does not occur in Latin America.21  
 
The effect of the ratio of manufactured exports to imports on the ratio of female to male 
employment rates is alternatively positive or negative, but in no case is the coefficient 
significant. The terms of trade index has a positive effect on relative female employment and 
that effect is quite large. This could be tied to the positive association between TOT and 
public budgets, or an increase in women’s employment in tradable sectors benefiting from 
the commodity price boom. It is also consistent with the high growth elasticity of female 
employment in the agricultural and fuel and ores country groupings illustrated in Table 5. In 
contrast, the coefficient on the real exchange rate, where a higher value indicates a currency 
depreciation, is positive and significant only in the fixed effects regression on 16 countries 
(column 3). The effect of the real interest rate is significant only in the 2SLS regressions and 
that effect is positive. While this might suggest that men are more concentrated in interest-
rate sensitive industries, the female employment regressions do not bear this out, as we will 
see below. In columns 3 and 4, we find that as the share of public investment rises, the 
female/male employment ratio rises. This effect is significant in the 2SLS regression but not 
the fixed effects model. Finally, as the share of fuel and ores in exports rises, we observe a 
positive effect on female relative employment. This is somewhat surprising, given that this 
sector is male-dominated and might be expected to benefit men’s employment more than 
women’s. It could be that there are spillover effects on women’s employment as a result of 
expansion of this sector not captured by the GDP growth variable.  
                                                
20 This does not preclude the possibility, however, that increases in the minimum wage reduce the demand for 
formal labor, shifting workers to the informal sector. We do not have sufficient data to rigorously evaluate this 
possibility. That said, a simple bivariate fixed effects regression that estimates the impact of changes in the real 
exchange rate on the female/males ratio of the share of workers employed in the informal sector yields a 
significant negative effect – that is, a depreciation reduces relative female informality. This regional-level impact 
on relative female/male informality may differ from country-specific effects.   
21 This observation does not necessarily contradict our findings on the growth elasticity of employment 
because the elasticity estimations do not control for any of the policy or economic structure variables included 
here (nor for the endogeneity of growth). A good next step in linking these two findings would be to conduct a 
multivariate regression analysis of the determinants of elasticity. 
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We now examine the determinants of just female employment. This is a useful exercise 
insofar as our concern is women’s absolute rather than relative well-being. Turning to the 
determinants of the female employment rate (columns 5-8), social spending and minimum 
wages exert a strong positive effect on female employment in all regressions. Neither GDP 
growth nor the ratio of manufacturing exports to imports has a statistically significant effect 
on women’s employment rates. The latter thus fails to provide support for the 
defeminization hypothesis, at least for this set of countries and time period. The terms of 
trade have a positive and statistically significant effect on female employment, as large as or 
larger than social spending and minimum wages.   
 
The determinants of male employment differ substantially from those of women (columns 
9-12). Here we observe that social spending has a negative effect on male employment in the 
2SLS regressions. Though a full understanding of why this coefficient is negative would 
require deeper analysis, one possibility is that social spending that equalizes the playing field 
for women in terms of education, health, and income supports results in higher female 
employment, some of which displaces male workers. Minimum wage hikes, however, have a 
positive effect on men’s employment in most of these equations, although the size of that 
effect is smaller than for women. Here again, we note that higher wages do not lower 
employment, perhaps due to the demand-side impact whereby workers spend a higher 
portion of their income than high-income groups. 
 
An interesting finding is that GDP growth has a positive significant effect on men’s 
employment rate, holding constant variables that control for the structure of the economy. 
This effect holds, however, only in the fixed effects regressions and is not robust. 
Manufacturing exports to imports and the terms of trade have no discernible effect on men’s 
employment, while the real exchange rate exerts a positive, if small effect only in equation 12, 
which omits Chile and the Dominican Republic. In contrast, public investment exerts 
upward pressure on men’s employment and while significant, the effect is not as large as on 
women’s employment. Oddly, fuel and ore exports do not have a significant effect on men’s 
employment, in contrast to the effect on women’s. This raises our suspicion that fuel and 
ores is picking up some sort of spillover effect limited primarily to female-dominated 
industries. 
 
We now turn to the results on the determinants of unemployment in Table 11. As a first 
note, these results are less robust than those with the employment rate ratio as the 
dependent variable. One explanation for this is the great variation in the way unemployment 
is measured across the region and over time within countries (Ball, de Roux, and Hofstetter 
2011).  Series covering different age groups and different definitions of unemployment are 
used, with some counting discouraged workers and some not. 
 
Regarding the regression results for the determinants of the female to male unemployment 
rate ratio (columns 1-4), most of the explanatory variables are insignificant. It is particularly 
noteworthy that the effect of the minimum wage is insignificant, suggesting that higher 
minimum wages (relative to the average monthly wage) do not contribute to higher relative 
female unemployment rates. Also, previous research suggests that the real exchange rate has 
an impact on unemployment, with depreciations stimulating exports and therefore demand 
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for labor (Frenkel and Ros 2006). That effect is not in evidence in these regressions, 
however. The only explanatory variable that shows a consistent (positive) statistically 
significant effect in three out of the four regressions is GDP growth. This implies that 
growth episodes are gender disabling, insofar as the ratio of female to male unemployment 
rises. As we will see in columns 5-12, this is because men’s unemployment falls more than 
women’s in response to increases in GDP. In the 2SLS regression that excludes public 
investment and fuel and ores as explanatory variables (column 2), the ratio of manufacturing 
exports to imports also shows a positive significant effect on the unemployment rate ratio, 
but this effect does not hold in the remaining regressions.  Finally, in the fixed effects 
regressions (columns 1 and 3), we see the real interest rate has a negative effect on the 
female/male unemployment rate ratio.  
 
The regression results are somewhat more illuminating when we consider the determinants 
of female and male unemployment separately. For females, we observe that increases in the 
minimum wage have a negative significant effect unemployment and these effects are quite 
large (and larger than in the employment regressions). GDP growth has a negative effect as 
we might expect, but this effect holds only in the fixed effects regressions. The coefficient 
estimates on the ratio of manufacturing exports to imports (hypothesized to contribute to 
defeminization of employment) are inconsistent, though significant in some of the 
regressions. Public investment has a significant negative effect on female unemployment, a 
result that is consistent with the employment regressions, and here, too, the effect is quite 
large. The share of fuel and ores in exports also exerts a negative effect on the female 
unemployment rate in the 2SLS regression, but not the fixed effects model. One concern 
with these results is that the terms of trade have a positive effect on female unemployment 
(only in the reduced sample of countries), and yet in the employment regressions (Table 11), 
terms of trade also had a positive effect on women’s employment rate. We are not able to 
explain these results, and given the small sample size, would suggest caution in drawing any 
inferences from these coefficient estimates without further investigation. 
 
With regard to the determinants of male unemployment, increases in the relative minimum 
wage reduce male unemployment in all four regressions (columns 9-12) and that effect is 
significant. GDP growth, too, exerts downward pressure on male unemployment, but this 
effect is significant only in the fixed effects regressions. We observe the same inconsistent 
pattern of estimated effects of the ratio of manufactured exports to imports as in the female 
unemployment regressions. The terms of trade have a significant positive effect on male 
unemployment in only the fixed effects model for the full sample, while the real exchange 
rate reduces male unemployment only in the 2SLS full sample regression. Neither of these 
independent variables produces sufficiently robust results that would allow us to make 
inferences about their effect on unemployment with any degree of certainty. And finally here, 
too, both public investment and fuel and ores as a share of exports reduce male 
unemployment, although only in the 2SLS regressions for the reduced sample (column 12).  
 
Summary o f  Econometr i c  Resul ts  
 
Several notable patterns emerge from these regression results. Most notably, relative 
minimum wages appear to be a boon to employment, both female and male, but the effect 
on women’s employment is larger. Social spending too exerts a positive effect on gender 
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equality in the employment regressions. Public investment benefits both women and men, 
though there is some evidence that women’s employment increases more from such 
investment. Finally, the terms of trade appear to be gender equalizing in terms of 
employment. It is not clear what the pathways by which terms of trade improvements lead to 
increased relative female employment. It is notable, however, that terms of trade fluctuations 
that reflect commodity price booms are by their nature unstable, and hence not a viable 
policy vehicle for promoting gender equality. Real exchange rates, on the other hand, are a 
policy vehicle for stimulating female employment as these results show. This exchange rate-
female employment nexus is straightforward. Real depreciations that lower the price of 
export goods achieve two goals. They stimulate employment-generating demand for the 
export good, and in female-dominated labor-intensive industries, reduce the pressure to 
lower wages as a means to achieve competitiveness.  
 
Notable in these econometric results is that GDP growth does not exhibit robust positive 
and significant gender effects on labor market outcomes, consistent with the findings of 
Seguino (2007). Finally, some of our remaining economic structure variables produce 
surprising results. The ratio of manufactured exports to imports appears to have little effect 
on female or male employment or their ratio, but produces inconsistent coefficient estimates 
in the unemployment regressions. This is an area for more research, as better and more 
extensive data become available. And finally, surprisingly, the expansion of fuels and ores as 
a share of exports appear to have positive effects on female relative and absolute 
employment rates, for reasons that are not clear.  
 
We caution again that our model does not include measures of unpaid labor burdens, as 
proxied by dependency ratios or fertility rates, due to the poor performance of these 
variables in the regressions and their effects on the remaining independent variables that 
appear implausible. Our results, therefore, may suffer from omitted variable bias, though this 
is more of a concern with the employment regressions than the unemployment regressions.  
 
VI.  Concluding Remarks 
 
The increases in growth and declines in inequality and poverty that have characterized much 
of the last decade in Latin America are promising indicators of a structural break with the 
crises of the 1980s and the lackluster neoliberal economic record of the 1990s. In this paper 
we take stock of these changes from the perspective of gender inequality in economic 
opportunities, exploring whether there is a link between approaches to and experiences of 
economic development and women’s relative access to economic opportunity. On the stock-
taking front, there is much improvement: women’s relative employment and wages are up 
(though the former is still low by world standards), while their relative rates of 
informalization are down. But we also see more gender inequality in unemployment and 
poverty, though the disproportionately negative impact of the 2009 economic crisis on 
women is likely driving these results, at least for the South American region. In terms of the 
growth elasticity of employment, the absolute and relative responsiveness of women’s 
employment to growth decreased noticeably in the latter 2000s relative to the 1990s.  
 
Moving beyond stock-taking and into making causal connections is more complex, partly 
because conducting a multivariate statistical study is simply more analytically demanding and 
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data requirements are intensive. While some of the variables in our regressions performed 
poorly or in unexpected ways, three variables stand out as having consistent gender 
equalizing effects in the labor market – social spending, minimum wages, and public 
investment. Less important or consistent were the effects of economic structure and GDP 
growth.  
 
In a review of neoliberal development macro and its gendered employment effects, 
Braunstein (2012) makes a number of observations that would be worthwhile to explore in 
more detail. For instance, globalization policies in the Latin American region seem more 
geared towards managing global capital flows and domestic inflation than creating 
employment, particularly for women. The continued promotion of liberalized trade and 
capital flows, coupled with the weak relationship between the real effective exchange rate 
index and women’s employment, are consistent with such an interpretation. Unpacking the 
role of changes in the terms of trade in terms of public budgets, the real exchange rate, and 
industrial structure would also be important in this regard. At the core of many of these 
issues is the absence of widespread, employment-generating industrial and development 
policies. Governments have proceeded much farther in terms of increasing and strategically 
targeting social spending, as evidenced by the role of social public expenditures in the 
regressions. But the evidence provided in this paper suggests that the effect of various 
development paths on gender inequality in economic opportunity has been less palpable.  
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Figure 1. Income Gini index by region, various years 
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Figure 2. Poverty rate by region, 1990s and 2000s 
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Figure 3. Female-to-male average years of education in population aged 15 and older, 1990 and 2010 
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Figure 4.  Average female-to-male employment to population ratio (15+), by country and region, 1990s versus 2000s 
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Figure 5. Percentage point change in average female-to-male employment to population ratio (15+), from the 1990s to the 2000s 
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Figure 6.  Average female-to-male unemployment rate by country and region, 1990s and 2000s 
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Figure 7.  Percentage point change in female-to-male unemployment rate from the 1990s to 2000s, by country and region 
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Figure 8.  Average female-to-male urban informalization rate by country and region, 1990s and 2000s 
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Figure 9.  Percentage point change in female-to-male urban informalization rate from the 1990s to 2000s, by country and region 
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Figure 10.  Average female-to-male urban wage ratio by country and region, 1990s and 2000s 
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Figure 11.  Percentage point change in female-to-male urban wage ratio from the 1990s to 2000s, by country and region 
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Figure 12. Gender wage ratio relative to the minimum-to-average wage: Percentage point changes in 
average values from the 1990s to the 2000s 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from CEPAL household survey data. Note that authors do not have observations for 
all years, and that the 1990s average female-to-male urban wage ratio for El Salvador is taken from 2000, and that of the Dominican 
Republic from 2002. 
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Figure 13. Average female-to-male poverty rates by country and region, 1990s and 2000s 
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Figure 14. Percentage point change in female-to-male poverty rates from the 1990s to 2000s, by country and region 
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Figure 15.  Difference between female-to-male poverty rates: 2009-10 average versus 2000s average  
 
  
 16 
Figure 16. Average female-to-male extreme poverty rates by country and region, 1990s and 2000s 
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Figure 17. Percentage point change in female-to-male extreme poverty rates from the 1990s to 2000s, by country and region 
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Figure 18.  Difference between female-to-male extreme poverty rates: 2009-10 average versus 2000s average  
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Figure 19. Gender and Household Income Inequality 
 
Panel A 
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Figure 19. Gender and Household Income Inequality cont inued  
 
Panel B 
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Figure 20. Employment to population ratio by sex, 1991-2010 
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Figure 21. Average social public expenditure as a share of GDP by country and region, 1990s and 2000s 
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Figure 22.  Percentage point change in average social public expenditure as share of GDP, 1990s to 2000s, by country and region 
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Figure 23. Minimum wage as a share of average wage by country and region, averages for 1990s and 2000s 
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Figure 24. Real effective exchange rate index by country and region, 1990-2010 (2005=100) 
 
 
 
 
Source:  Authors’ compilation based on data from ECLAC-CEPALSTAT, except for Argentina, which the authors figured by multiplying Argentina’s nominal exchange rate by 
the ratio of GDP deflator of the U.S. to that of Argentina’s. Note that an INCREASE in the index is equivalent to a depreciation of the exchange rate, and a DECREASE 
indicates an exchange rate appreciation. 
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Figure 25. Real interest rate by country and region, various time periods 
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Figure 25. Real interest rate by country and region cont inued  
 
 
Source: Authors’ compilation based on data from WDI database. 
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Figure 26. Public investment as a share of GDP by country, average for the early 1990s versus the late 2000s 
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Figure 27. Manufacturing exports as a share of manufacturing imports, by country and region (percent) 
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Figure 28. Fuel & ores as a share of merchandise exports by country and region, 1990-2010 average 
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Figure 29. Terms of trade indices by country and region, 1990-2010 (2000=100) 
 
  
Source: Authors’ compilation based on data from WDI database. 
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Figure 30. Change in average share of trade and current account in GDP, 1990s and 2000s 
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Figure 31. Changes in the dependency ratio 
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Table 1.  Average annual real per capita GDP growth, various years 
 1990-97  1998-02  2003-08  2009  2010 
Central America & Mexico 
Costa Rica 2.2%  2.1%  4.2%  -2.8%  2.7% 
Dominican Republic 2.6%  3.8%  4.3%  2.1%  6.3% 
El Salvador 3.8%  2.2%  2.4%  -3.6%  0.9% 
Guatemala 1.6%  1.3%  1.4%  -1.9%  0.2% 
Honduras 0.7%  0.5%  3.5%  -4.1%  0.7% 
Mexico 1.3%  1.7%  1.8%  -7.4%  4.2% 
Nicaragua 0.1%  2.1%  3.0%  -4.5%  6.1% 
Panama 3.5%  1.4%  6.5%  0.8%  3.2% 
Andean Region          
Bolivia 2.0%  0.3%  2.6%  1.7%  2.5% 
Colombia 2.1%  -0.7%  3.6%  0.2%  2.6% 
Ecuador 0.8%  0.2%  3.6%  -1.1%  2.1% 
Peru 2.1%  0.2%  5.8%  -0.2%  7.6% 
Venezuela 1.6%  -3.3%  5.6%  -4.7%  -3.0% 
South America          
Argentina 4.2%  -4.1%  7.5%  0.0%  8.2% 
Brazil 0.5%  0.3%  3.1%  -1.5%  6.6% 
Chile 5.8%  1.2%  3.6%  -2.6%  4.2% 
Paraguay 0.7%  -2.5%  2.7%  -5.5%  13.0% 
Uruguay 3.6%  -2.5%  5.0%  2.6%  8.1% 
          
Latin America, average 2.2%  0.2%  3.9%  -1.8%  4.2% 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from WDI database. Growth based on real local currency. 
Average for Latin America not weighted by population. 
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Table 2. Gini index by country, various years 
 1990  1997  2002  2008 
        
Central America & Mexico 
Costa Rica 44.0  44.9  49.8  48.7 
Dominican Republic 48.6  48.5  50.0  49.7 
El Salvador 52.3  52.2  52.2  46.6 
Guatemala 57.7  56.4  58.2  54.4 
Honduras 53.5  52.8  56.7  55.3 
Mexico 52.2  54.1  51.0  50.5 
Nicaragua 55.5  55.3  50.6  52.3 
Panama 55.0  56.7  56.4  52.1 
        
Andean Region 
Bolivia 54.5  58.0  60.1  57.2 
Colombia 51.9  55.9  55.6  58.9 
Ecuador   58.1  55.0  50.2 
Peru 46.4  53.7  54.3  47.0 
Venezuela 42.5  47.0  47.5  41.2 
        
South America 
Argentina 45.6  48.3  53.3  45.9 
Brazil 60.4  59.3  58.3  54.2 
Chile 55.1  55.1  54.8  51.9 
Paraguay   56.4  57.2  52.1 
Uruguay 42.4  42.8  45.4  44.7 
Source and notes: See Figure 1. 
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Table 3. Trends in Female and Male Income Shares: The Ratio of Q1 to Q5 
  Late 2000s Percentage point 
change from early to 
late 2000s 
     
  Female Male Female Male 
Argentina 9.2% 9.5% -1.5 -0.6 
Bolivia 4.4% 3.7% 1.2 1.1 
Brazil 7.3% 7.4% 1.9 2.1 
Chile 10.5% 8.8% 1.7 2.5 
Colombia 4.8% 5.2% 0.5 0.8 
Costa Rica 7.2% 7.7% -2.9 -2.7 
Ecuador 9.0% 8.3% 2.3 2.8 
El Salvador 8.3% 7.6% -0.2 -1.1 
Guatemala 4.9% 3.9% 4.9 3.9 
Honduras 4.1% 3.9% -1.9 -3.1 
Mexico 4.7% 4.4% -0.1 0.1 
Nicaragua 7.7% 7.2% 7.7 7.2 
Panama 6.5% 6.3% -0.5 0.5 
Paraguay 6.0% 5.5% 1.6 1.6 
Peru 4.3% 4.6% 0.9 1.0 
Dominican Republic 9.0% 9.4% 1.1 1.2 
Uruguay 7.1% 7.1% -1.7 -1.1 
Venezuela 19.2% 21.9% 7.8 10.1 
Note: Data in bold are for those countries with greater male improvements in equality 
than female. Q1 refers to the first quintile of the income distribution, and Q5 to the 
fifth. 
Source: Authors' calculations based on CEPALSTAT household survey data. 
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Table 4. Countries categorized by industrial and trade structures 
Manufacturing  
Fuel & 
Ores  Agricultural 
Argentina 
Brazil 
Costa Rica 
Dominican Republic 
El Salvador 
Mexico 
Panama 
Uruguay 
 Bolivia 
Chile 
Colombia 
Ecuador 
Peru 
Venezuela 
 Guatemala 
Honduras 
Nicaragua 
Paraguay 
Notes: See text for explanation of how countries are categorized. 
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Table 5.  Growth elasticity of employment, various time periods 
 1991-2010 1991-1997 1998-2002 2003-2010 
 
Latin America 
female 0.95 0.87 0.55 0.67 
male 0.54 0.46 0.35 0.44 
female/male 1.76 1.89 1.57 1.52 
GDP growth 3.76% 4.33% 1.76% 4.51% 
     
Group 1: Manufacturing 
female 0.82 0.66 0.38 0.60 
male 0.46 0.36 0.26 0.38 
female/male 1.78 1.83 1.46 1.58 
GDP growth 4.00% 4.69% 1.84% 4.75% 
     
Group 2: Fuel & Ores 
female 1.03 1.04 0.92 0.62 
male 0.56 0.49 0.49 0.43 
female/male 1.84 2.12 1.88 1.44 
GDP growth 3.75% 4.48% 1.26% 4.66% 
     
Group 3: Agricultural 
female 1.12 1.05 0.66 1.09 
male 0.70 0.72 0.47 0.71 
female/male 1.60 1.46 1.40 1.54 
GDP growth 3.30% 3.38% 2.35% 3.83% 
Source & notes: Authors’ calculations based on the following regression equation: 
lnEit =! i + " lnYit + # it , where lnEit  is the natural log of employment in country i and year t, while 
lnYit  is the natural log of real income in local currency. GDP growth refers to average annual real growth in 
local currency units. See data appendix for more details on data sources. 
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Table 6.  Growth elasticity of employment controlling for labor supply, various time periods 
 
1991-2010 1991-1997 1998-2002 2003-2010 
 
Latin America 
female 0.14 0.08 0.11 0.24 
male 0.08 0.02 0.11 0.16 
female/male 1.75 4.00 1.00 1.50 
GDP growth 3.76% 4.33% 1.76% 4.51% 
     
Group 1: Manufacturing  
female 0.22 0.01 0.10 0.25 
male 0.10 -0.03 0.11 0.16 
female/male 2.20 -0.33 0.91 1.56 
GDP growth 4.00% 4.69% 1.84% 4.75% 
     
Group 2: Fuel & Ores 
female 0.10 0.17 0.16 0.25 
male 0.06 0.07 0.13 0.22 
female/male 1.67 2.43 1.23 1.14 
GDP growth 3.75% 4.48% 1.26% 4.66% 
     
Group 3: Agriculture 
female 0.06 0.11 0.08 0.19 
male 0.08 0.08 0.13 0.20 
female/male 0.75 1.38 0.62 0.95 
GDP growth 3.30% 3.38% 2.35% 3.83% 
Source & notes: Authors’ calculations based on the following regression equation: 
lnEit =! i + " lnYit + lnLFit + # it , where lnEit  is the natural log of (female or male) employment in 
country i and year t, lnYit  is the natural log of real income in local currency, and lnLFit  is the natural log of 
the (female or male) labor force. See data appendix for more details on data sources. In cases where the 
elasticity coefficient !  was not statistically significant at a 90 percent confidence interval or more, elasticity 
estimate is in italics. 
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Table 7. Growth elasticity of employment by country, 1991-2010 
 Female  Male  Female/ Male 
 Average annual 
GDP growth 
Argentina 0.78  0.44  1.77  4.34% 
Bolivia 0.96  0.65  1.48  3.73% 
Brazil 0.92  0.56  1.64  3.03% 
Chile 0.67  0.32  2.09  5.00% 
Colombia 1.66  0.71  2.34  3.31% 
Costa Rica 1.01  0.57  1.77  4.67% 
Dominican Republic 0.66  0.36  1.83  5.52% 
Ecuador 1.19  0.68  1.75  3.14% 
El Salvador 0.71  0.28  2.54  3.18% 
Guatemala 1.08  0.67  1.61  3.66% 
Honduras 0.98  0.67  1.46  3.61% 
Mexico 1.19  0.63  1.89  2.58% 
Nicaragua 1.27  0.63  2.02  3.11% 
Panama 0.84  0.55  1.53  5.54% 
Paraguay 1.25  1.00  1.25  2.84% 
Peru 0.93  0.52  1.79  4.71% 
Uruguay 0.57  0.21  2.71  3.13% 
Venezuela 1.32  0.80  1.65  2.57% 
Source: See Table 5. 
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Table 8. Growth elasticity of employment by country controlling for labor supply, 1991-2010 
 
Female  Male  Female/ Male 
 Average annual 
GDP growth 
Argentina 0.15  0.15  1.00  4.34% 
Bolivia -0.05  -0.02  2.50  3.73% 
Brazil 0.08  0.20  0.40  3.03% 
Chile 0.02  0.01  2.00  5.00% 
Colombia 0.14  0.08  1.75  3.31% 
Costa Rica 0.17  0.21  0.81  4.67% 
Dominican Republic 0.79  0.18  4.39  5.52% 
Ecuador 0.08  0.05  1.60  3.14% 
El Salvador 0.04  0.03  1.33  3.18% 
Guatemala 0.12  0.08  1.50  3.66% 
Honduras -0.01  0.07  -0.14  3.61% 
Mexico 0.34  0.25  1.36  2.58% 
Nicaragua 0.00  0.15  0.07  3.11% 
Panama 0.31  0.20  1.55  5.54% 
Paraguay 0.27  0.25  1.08  2.84% 
Peru -0.05  0.03  -1.67  4.71% 
Uruguay 0.12  0.05  2.40  3.13% 
Venezuela 0.36  0.28  1.29  2.57% 
Source: See Table 6. In cases where the elasticity coefficient estimate is not statistically significant at 90 percent or more, the 
elasticity is recorded in italics. 
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Table 9. Growth elasticity of formal employment, various time periods 
 
1991-2010 1991-1997 1998-2002 2003-2010 
 
Latin America 
female 0.94 0.53 0.25 0.74 
male 0.57 0.22 0.37 0.54 
female/male 1.65 2.41 0.68 1.37 
GDP growth 3.76% 4.33% 1.76% 4.51% 
     
Group 1: Manufacturing  
female 0.85 0.74 0.46 0.66 
male 0.52 0.43 0.52 0.45 
female/male 1.63 1.72 0.88 1.47 
GDP growth 4.00% 4.69% 1.84% 4.75% 
     
Group 2: Fuel & Ores 
female 0.89 0.46 0.87 0.74 
male 0.46 0.05 0.24 0.51 
female/male 1.93 9.20 3.63 1.45 
GDP growth 3.75% 4.48% 1.26% 4.66% 
     
Group 3: Agriculture 
female 1.51 -0.04 -1.50 1.60 
male 1.08 -0.11 0.03 1.70 
female/male 1.40 0.36 -50.00 0.94 
GDP growth 3.30% 3.38% 2.35% 3.83% 
Source & notes: Authors’ calculations based on the following regression equation: 
lnEit =! i + " lnYit + # it , where lnEit  is the natural log of f o rmal  employment in country i and year t, 
while lnYit  is the natural log of real income in local currency. See data appendix for more details on data 
sources. In cases where the elasticity coefficient is not statistically significant at a 90 percent confidence interval 
or more, elasticity is recorded in italics. 
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Table 10. Determinants of female and male employment rates 
 	   Ratio	  F/M	  Employment	  Rates	   Female	  Employment	  Rate	   Male	  Employment	  Rate	  	  	   FE	   2SLS	   FE	   2SLS	   FE	   2SLS	   FE	   2SLS	   FE	   2SLS	   FE	   2SLS	  	  	   1	   2	   3	   4	   5	   6	   7	   8	   9	   10	   11	   12	  Social	  spending	  (log)	   0.320***	   0.126***	   0.204**	   0.241***	   0.292***	   0.0692***	   0.185**	   0.195***	   -­‐0.019	   -­‐0.057***	   -­‐0.019	   -­‐0.046***	  	   (0.082)	   (0.022)	   (0.079)	   (0.020)	   (0.082)	   (0.0247	   (0.079)	   (0.0233	   (0.018)	   (0.009)	   (0.019)	   (0.009)	  Min.	  wage/Avg.	  wage	  (log)	   0.078	   0.088***	   0.100**	   0.130***	   0.0945*	   0.169***	   0.145***	   0.221***	   0.024	   0.081***	   0.045***	   0.091***	  	   (0.05)	   (0.024)	   (0.04)	   (0.031)	   (0.049)	   (0.0261	   (0.042)	   (0.034)	   (0.016)	   (0.008)	   (0.012)	   (0.01)	  Growth	  of	  GDP	   -­‐0.0003	   0.005	   -­‐0.0002	   0.004	   0.002	   0.00492	   0.001	   0.004	   0.002**	   -­‐0.0001	   0.001*	   -­‐0.0004	  	   (0.001)	   (0.004)	   (0.001)	   (0.003)	   (0.002)	   (0.00439	   (0.002)	   (0.003)	   (0.001)	   (0.002)	   (0.0005)	   (0.001)	  Mfg	  X/Mfg	  M	  (log)	   0.061	   -­‐0.001	   0.029	   -­‐0.001	   0.044	   0.00003	   0.028	   0.0001	   -­‐0.010	   0.001	   -­‐0.0004	   0.001	  	   (0.05)	   (0.0003)	   (0.051)	   (0.0003)	   (0.048)	   (0.0004)	   (0.054)	   (0.0003)	   (0.01)	   (0.0002)	   (0.009)	   (0.0002)	  Terms	  of	  trade	  (log)	   0.155*	   0.242***	   -­‐0.056	   0.318***	   0.156*	   0.220***	   -­‐0.023	   0.353***	   0.004	   -­‐0.022	   0.033	   0.035	  	   (0.088)	   (0.065)	   (0.105)	   (0.064)	   (0.087)	   (0.075)	   (0.108)	   (0.066)	   (0.024)	   (0.022)	   (0.025)	   (0.024)	  REER	  (log)	   0.068	   -­‐0.002	   0.143***	   0.063	   0.035	   0.0105	   0.123***	   0.094*	   -­‐0.015	   0.0124	   -­‐0.020	   0.031*	  	   (0.067)	   (0.042)	   (0.038)	   (0.053)	   (0.059)	   (0.052)	   (0.036)	   (0.057)	   (0.015)	   (0.025)	   (0.012)	   (0.017)	  Real	  interest	  rate	   -­‐0.001	   0.003***	   -­‐0.0005	   0.002***	   	  	   0.004***	   -­‐0.0006	   0.002***	   -­‐0.0002	   0.0003	   -­‐0.0001	   -­‐0.00001	  	   (0.001)	   (0.001)	   (0.001)	   (0.001)	   	  	   (0.001)	   (0.001)	   (0.001)	   (0.0002)	   (0.0003)	   (0.0002)	   (0.0002)	  Public	  Investment	   	  	   	   0.036	   0.059***	   	  	   	   0.073**	   0.121***	   	  	   	   0.036***	   0.063***	  	   	  	   	   (0.031)	   (0.015)	   	  	   	   (0.029)	   (0.016)	   	  	   	   (0.011)	   (0.007)	  Fuel	  and	  ores	   	  	   	   0.035**	   0.035***	   	  	   	   0.030*	   0.033***	   	  	   	   -­‐0.005	   -­‐0.002	  	   	  	   	   (0.012)	   (0.008)	   	  	   	   (0.015)	   (0.008)	   	  	   	   (0.007)	   (0.002)	  Constant	   1.720**	   2.233***	   2.564***	   1.085***	   1.633**	   1.816***	   2.078***	   0.174	   4.368***	   4.188***	   4.119***	   3.694***	  	   (0.612)	   (0.378)	   (0.528)	   (0.323)	   (0.606)	   (0.484)	   (0.572)	   (0.349)	   (0.17)	   (0.177)	   (0.146)	   (0.151)	  	   	  	   	   	   	   	  	   	   	   	   	  	   	   	   	  Observations	   283	   257	   176	   172	   303	   257	   176	   172	   283	   257	   176	   172	  Overall	  R2	   0.094	   0.307	   0.260	   0.627	   0.05	   0.260	   0.249	   0.583	   0.1567	   0.475	   0.371	   0.714	  No.	  of	  countries	   18	   18	   16	   16	   18	   18	   16	   16	   18	   18	   16	   16	  
 Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** significance at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level. 
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Table 11. Determinants of female and male unemployment rates 
 	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	   Ratio	  F/M	  Unemployment	  Rates	   Female	  Unemployment	  Rate	   Male	  Unemployment	  Rate	  	  	   FE	   2SLS	   FE	   2SLS	   FE	   2SLS	   FE	   2SLS	   FE	   2SLS	   FE	   2SLS	  	  	   1	   2	   3	   4	   5	   6	   7	   8	   9	   10	   11	   12	  Social	  spending	  (log)	   0.019	   -­‐0.036	   -­‐0.047	   0.054	   0.103	   -­‐0.012	   -­‐0.051	   0.105	   0.083	   0.024	   -­‐0.004	   0.051	  	   (0.172)	   (0.038)	   (0.142)	   (0.044)	   (0.152)	   (0.087)	   (0.189)	   (0.095)	   (0.17)	   (0.071)	   (0.226)	   (0.076)	  Min.	  wage/Avg.	  wage	  (log)	   0.078	   0.015	   0.032	   -­‐0.020	   -­‐0.224*	   -­‐0.319***	   -­‐0.211**	   -­‐0.496***	   -­‐0.302**	   -­‐0.335***	   -­‐0.243***	   -­‐0.477***	  	   (0.106)	   (0.047)	   (0.081)	   (0.074)	   (0.122)	   (0.084)	   (0.095)	   (0.112)	   (0.124)	   (0.066)	   (0.071)	   (0.086)	  Growth	  of	  GDP	   0.006*	   0.015***	   0.010***	   0.013*	   -­‐0.020***	   0.002	   -­‐0.013***	   0.001	   -­‐0.026***	   -­‐0.013	   -­‐0.022***	   -­‐0.013	  	   (0.003)	   (0.006)	   (0.003)	   (0.007)	   (0.004)	   (0.016)	   (0.004)	   (0.015)	   (0.005)	   (0.013)	   (0.005)	   (0.011)	  Mfg	  X/Mfg	  M	  (log)	   0.042	   0.002***	   0.013	   -­‐0.001	   0.287***	   -­‐0.002	   0.297***	   -­‐0.137***	   0.245***	   -­‐0.004***	   0.283***	   0.013***	  	   (0.035)	   (0.001)	   (0.039)	   (0.001)	   (0.081)	   (0.002)	   (0.072)	   (0.001)	   (0.083)	   (0.001)	   (0.088)	   (0.001)	  Terms	  of	  trade	  (log)	   0.061	   -­‐0.065	   0.152	   -­‐0.059	   0.368*	   0.120	   0.730**	   0.510*	   0.307*	   0.185	   0.578*	   0.569***	  	   (0.068)	   (0.089)	   (0.114)	   (0.157)	   (0.182)	   (0.18)	   (0.327)	   (0.268)	   (0.167)	   (0.136)	   (0.326)	   (0.182)	  REER	  (log)	   -­‐0.108	   0.144	   -­‐0.154	   0.218	   -­‐0.067	   -­‐0.305	   -­‐0.060	   -­‐0.095	   0.041	   -­‐0.449***	   0.095	   -­‐0.313	  	   (0.107)	   (0.093)	   (0.105)	   (0.134)	   (0.177)	   (0.207)	   (0.213)	   (0.26)	   (0.141)	   (0.17)	   (0.209)	   (0.192)	  Real	  interest	  rate	   -­‐0.003***	   0.001	   -­‐0.002**	   0.0003	   -­‐0.003***	   0.002	   -­‐0.002**	   0.0004	   -­‐0.001	   0.001	   0.0003	   0.0001	  	   (0.001)	   (0.001)	   (0.001)	   (0.001)	   (0.001)	   (0.002)	   (0.001)	   (0.002)	   (0.001)	   (0.001)	   (0.001)	   (0.001)	  Public	  Investment	   	  	   	   -­‐0.062	   -­‐0.042	   	  	   	   -­‐0.164**	   -­‐0.446***	   	  	   	   -­‐0.102	   -­‐0.404***	  	   	  	   	   (0.086)	   (0.052)	   	  	   	   (0.069)	   (0.087)	   	  	   	   (0.095)	   (0.067)	  Fuel	  and	  ores	   	  	   	   0.004	   0.0174	   	  	   	   0.018	   -­‐0.047*	   	  	   	   0.014	   -­‐0.064***	  	   	  	   	   (0.043)	   (0.015)	   	  	   	   (0.096)	   (0.026)	   	  	   	   (0.096)	   (0.019)	  Constant	   4.750***	   4.540***	   5.019***	   4.231***	   0.524	   4.305***	   0.818	   2.997*	   0.379	   4.370***	   -­‐1.233	   3.371***	  	   (0.512)	   (0.567)	   (0.749)	   (0.911)	   (1.041)	   (1.306)	   (1.225)	   (1.639)	   (1.277)	   (1.084)	   (1.618)	   (1.188)	  	   	  	   	   	   	   	  	   	   	   	   	  	   	   	   	  Observations	   261	   233	   159	   154	   261	   233	   159	   154	   261	   233	   159	   154	  Overall	  R2	   0.002	   0.114	   0.002	   0.071	   0.002	   0.065	   0.008	   0.412	   0.002	   0.172	   0.002	   0.524	  No.	  of	  countries	   18	   18	   16	   16	   18	   18	   16	   16	   18	   18	   16	   16	  
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** significance at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level. 
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Data Appendix 
 
 
 
Variable Explanation Source 
Overa l l  inequal i t y  and pover ty  
Gini index Gini index on household income. Few Latin 
American surveys have questions on taxes, so 
IDLA works under the presumption that wage 
earners report net income and the (few) self-
employed that pay taxes report gross income, so 
the index includes both net and gross income 
receipts (Martorano and Cornia 2011: 13). 
Inequality and Development in Latin America (IDLA) dataset, 
which built the series based on data from SEDLAC, WIID, 
CEPALSTAT, WDI, SWIID Version 3.0 and national 
sources, as well as interpolation when data was missing 
(Martorano and Cornia 2011: 13). 
Poverty rate Percentage of the population that falls below the 
level of resources necessary to satisfy basic 
nutritional and non-nutritional needs. 
ECLAC-CEPALSTAT 
Gender  Inequal i ty  Variab le s   
F/M secondary 
education 
Female-to-male ratio of average years of 
education in population aged 15 and older 
Authors’ calculations based on Barro and Lee (2010), version 
1.2, Sept. 2011. 
F/M 
employment rate 
Female-to-male employment to population ratio, 
aged 15 and older 
Authors’ calculations based on employment-to-population 
data from World Development Indicators (WDI) database.  
F/M 
unemployment 
rate 
Ratio of female-to-male unemployment rates Authors’ calculations based on employment-to-population 
data from WDI database. 
F/M Wage Female-to-male urban wage ratio for workers 
between the ages of 20 and 49 who work 35 or 
more hours per week. 
ECLAC-CEPALSTAT 
F/M informal 
employment 
Female-to-male ratio of the urban population 
employed in low productivity sectors of the labor 
market (informal sector) 
Authors’ calculations based on data from ECLAC-
CEPALSTAT. 
F/M poverty 
rate 
Female-to-male ratio of poverty, with the latter 
described as not having the resources necessary 
to satisfy basic nutritional and non-nutritional 
needs. Number of women and men living in 
poverty refers to the number living in poor 
households as derived from household surveys.  
Authors’ compilation of data from ECLAC-CEPALSTAT on 
the femininity rate of poverty. 
F/M extreme 
poverty rate 
Female-to-male ratio of extreme poverty, with 
the latter described as not having the resources 
necessary to satisfy basic nutritional needs. 
Number of women and men living in poverty 
refers to the number living in poor households as 
derived from household surveys. 
Authors’ compilation of data from ECLAC-CEPALSTAT on 
the femininity rate of extreme poverty/indigence. 
Elast i c i t y  Est imates  
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Variable Explanation Source 
Employment Employment in the population 15 and older, 
female or male  
Calculated by multiplying the employment to population ratio 
by population. Population numbers are in turn figured by 
dividing the number of people in the labor force (derived by 
multiplying the total labor force by the percent of the labor 
force that is female or male) by the labor force participation 
rate. All data drawn from the WDI database, and refers 
exclusively to the female or male population aged 15 and 
older. 
Pol i cy  Variab le s  
Social public 
expenditure 
Central government social spending as a share of 
GDP 
1990-2006 from IDLA dataset; 2007-2010 from ECLAC-
CEPALSTAT. 
Minimum 
wage/Average 
wage 
Monthly real minimum wage divided by the 
monthly real average wage. 
Authors’ calculations based on data from ECLAC-
CEPALSTAT. 
REER Real effective exchange rate index (2005=100). A 
decrease is equivalent to an appreciation, and an 
increase is equivalent to a depreciation. 
ECLAC-CEPALSTAT, except for Argentina, which the 
authors figured by multiplying Argetina’s nominal exchange 
rate by the ratio of GDP deflator of the U.S. to that of 
Argentina’s. 
Real interest 
rate 
Nominal lending rate minus the rate of inflation. WDI database 
Public 
investment  
Public gross fixed capital formation as a share of 
GDP. 
Authors’ calculations based on two series from the WDI 
database: private and total gross fixed capital formation as a 
share of GDP. 
Economic  Struc ture  Variab le s  
Mfg X/Mfg M Ratio of manufacturing exports to manufacturing 
imports, normalized  
Authors’ calculations based on data from WDI database. 
Fuel & ores Fuel & ores as share of merchandise exports WDI database 
Terms of trade Net barter terms of trade index, (2000=100) WDI database 
Other  var iab le s  
Growth Annual per capita GDP growth based on real 
local currency 
WDI database 
Dependency 
ratio 
Sum of population younger than 15 and 65 and 
older as a share of the population between 15 
and 65.  
Authors’ calculations based on data from WDI database. 
 
